Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9830
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dc.contributor.authorSağlam, İsmail-
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-25T20:48:11Z-
dc.date.available2022-12-25T20:48:11Z-
dc.date.issued2013-
dc.identifier.issn1545-2921-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/9830-
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces a class of endogenously proportional bargaining solutions. These solutions are inside the class of Directional solutions, which Chun and Thomson (1987) proposed to generalize (exogenously) proportional solutions of Kalai (1977). Endogenously proportional solutions are characterized by weak Pareto optimality arid continuity together with two new axioms that depend on the total payoff asymmetry of the bargaining problem. Each of these solutions satisfies the basic symmetry axiom and also a stronger axiom called total payoff symmetry.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipTurkish Academy of Sciencesen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThe author thanks the Associate Editor Timothy Van Zandt and an anonymous reviewer for helpful remarks and suggestions that have greatly improved this paper The author also acknowledges the research support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences. The usual disclaimer applies.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherEconomics Bulletinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Bulletinen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.titleEndogenously Proportional Bargaining Solutionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentESTÜen_US
dc.identifier.volume33en_US
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.startpage1521en_US
dc.identifier.endpage1534en_US
dc.authoridSaglam, Ismail/0000-0002-9561-9476-
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000420007200059en_US
dc.institutionauthor[Belirlenecek]-
dc.authorwosidSaglam, Ismail/GLT-2744-2022-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ3-
dc.identifier.trdiziniden_US]
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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