Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8876
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dc.contributor.authorCaskurlu, Bugra-
dc.contributor.authorEkici, Ozgun-
dc.contributor.authorKizilkaya, Fatih Erdem-
dc.date.accessioned2022-11-30T19:23:01Z-
dc.date.available2022-11-30T19:23:01Z-
dc.date.issued2022-
dc.identifier.issn0960-1295-
dc.identifier.issn1469-8072-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1017/S0960129522000214-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8876-
dc.description.abstractIn a strategic-form game, a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by considering various restrictions on coalition formation. For instance, in a Nash equilibrium, it is assumed that viable coalitions are singletons, and in a super strong equilibrium, it is assumed that every coalition is viable. Restrictions on coalition formation can be justified by communication limitations, coordination problems, or institutional constraints. In this paper, inspired by social structures in various real-life scenarios, we introduce certain restrictions on coalition formation, and on their basis, we introduce a number of equilibrium notions. As an application, we study our equilibrium notions in resource selection games (RSGs), and we present a complete set of existence and nonexistence results for general RSGs and their important special cases.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipScientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUB.ITAK) [118E126]en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work is supported by The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUB.ITAK) (grant number 118E126).en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherCambridge Univ Pressen_US
dc.relation.ispartofMathematical Structures In Computer Scienceen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectExistence of equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectresource selection gamesen_US
dc.subjectcoalition structuresen_US
dc.subjectProof Nash Equilibriaen_US
dc.subjectStrategyen_US
dc.subjectGamesen_US
dc.titleOn Existence of Equilibrium Under Social Coalition Structuresen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.authoridEkici, Ozgun/0000-0001-7053-4735-
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000832774600001en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85142166613en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S0960129522000214-
dc.authorwosidEkici, Ozgun/AAE-4055-2019-
dc.authorscopusid35104543000-
dc.authorscopusid55711260700-
dc.authorscopusid55908061300-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2-
dc.ozel2022v3_Editen_US
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept02.1. Department of Artificial Intelligence Engineering-
Appears in Collections:Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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