Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8598
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dc.contributor.authorArikan, Kerem-
dc.contributor.authorPalumbo, Alessandro-
dc.contributor.authorCassano, Luca-
dc.contributor.authorReviriego, Pedro-
dc.contributor.authorPontarelli, Salvatore-
dc.contributor.authorBianchi, Giuseppe-
dc.contributor.authorErgin, Oğuz-
dc.date.accessioned2022-07-30T16:41:52Z-
dc.date.available2022-07-30T16:41:52Z-
dc.date.issued2022-
dc.identifier.citationArikan, K., Palumbo, A., Cassano, L., Reviriego, P., Pontarelli, S., Bianchi, G., ... & Ottavi, M. (2022). Processor Security: Detecting Microarchitectural Attacks via Count-Min Sketches. IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1063-8210-
dc.identifier.issn1557-9999-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1109/TVLSI.2022.3171810-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8598-
dc.description.abstractThe continuous quest for performance pushed processors to incorporate elements such as multiple cores, caches, acceleration units, or speculative execution that make systems very complex. On the other hand, these features often expose unexpected vulnerabilities that pose new challenges. For example, the timing differences introduced by caches or speculative execution can be exploited to leak information or detect activity patterns. Protecting embedded systems from existing attacks is extremely challenging, and it is made even harder by the continuous rise of new microarchitectural attacks (e.g., the Spectre and Orchestration attacks). In this article, we present a new approach based on count-min sketches for detecting microarchitectural attacks in the microprocessors featured by embedded systems. The idea is to add to the system a security checking module (without modifying the microprocessor under protection) in charge of observing the fetched instructions and identifying and signaling possible suspicious activities without interfering with the nominal activity of the system. The proposed approach can be programmed at design time (and reprogrammed after deployment) in order to always keep updated the list of the attacks that the checker is able to identify. We integrated the proposed approach in a large RISC-V core, and we proved its effectiveness in detecting several versions of the Spectre, Orchestration, Rowhammer, and Flush + Reload attacks. In its best configuration, the proposed approach has been able to detect 100% of the attacks, with no false alarms and introducing about 10% area overhead, about 4% power increase, and without working frequency reduction.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherIEEE-Inst Electrical Electronics Engineers Incen_US
dc.relation.ispartofIEEE Transactions On Very Large Scale Integration (Vlsi) Systemsen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectMicroarchitectureen_US
dc.subjectSecurityen_US
dc.subjectMicroprocessorsen_US
dc.subjectHazardsen_US
dc.subjectCodesen_US
dc.subjectHardwareen_US
dc.subjectTimingen_US
dc.subjectEmbedded systemsen_US
dc.subjecthardware securityen_US
dc.subjectmicroarchitectural attacksen_US
dc.subjectmicroprocessorsen_US
dc.subjectRISC-Ven_US
dc.subjectSide-Channel Attacksen_US
dc.titleProcessor Security: Detecting Microarchitectural Attacks Via Count-Min Sketchesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, Mühendislik Fakültesi, Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümüen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.authoridCASSANO, LUCA MARIA/0000-0003-3824-7714-
dc.authoridOttavi, Marco/0000-0002-5064-7342-
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000799604400001en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85130474769en_US
dc.institutionauthorErgin, Oğuz-
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TVLSI.2022.3171810-
dc.authorwosidOttavi, Marco/H-4192-2011-
dc.authorscopusid57702277900-
dc.authorscopusid57220067407-
dc.authorscopusid42261134500-
dc.authorscopusid19639262200-
dc.authorscopusid6602250777-
dc.authorscopusid57193527025-
dc.authorscopusid6603141208-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept02.3. Department of Computer Engineering-
Appears in Collections:Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Computer Engineering
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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