Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8200
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dc.contributor.authorÇaşkurlu, B.-
dc.contributor.authorEkici, Ö.-
dc.contributor.authorKızılkaya, F.E.-
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-15T13:00:36Z-
dc.date.available2022-01-15T13:00:36Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.isbn9783030895426-
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-89543-3_4-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/8200-
dc.description27th International Conference on Computing and Combinatorics, COCOON 2021 -- 24 October 2021 through 26 October 2021 -- 267259en_US
dc.description.abstractWe study the subclass of singleton congestion games in which there are identical resources with increasing cost functions. In this domain, we prove that there always exists an outcome that is resilient to weakly-improving deviations by singletons (i.e., the outcome is a Nash equilibrium), by the grand coalition (i.e., the outcome is Pareto efficient), and by coalitions with respect to an a priori given partition coalition structure (i.e., the outcome is a partition equilibrium). To our knowledge, this is the strongest existence guarantee in the literature on congestion games when weakly-improving deviations are considered. Our proof technique gives the false impression of a potential function argument but it is a novel application of proof by contradiction. © 2021, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.en_US
dc.description.sponsorship118E126; Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştirma Kurumu, TÜBITAKen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work is supported by The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK) through grant 118E126.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbHen_US
dc.relation.ispartofLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)en_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectPareto principleen_US
dc.subjectCoalition structureen_US
dc.subjectCongestion Gamesen_US
dc.subjectCost-functionen_US
dc.subjectIncreasing costsen_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriaen_US
dc.subjectNovel applicationsen_US
dc.subjectPareto-efficienten_US
dc.subjectPartition equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectPotential functionen_US
dc.subjectCost functionsen_US
dc.titleOn Singleton Congestion Games With Resilience Against Collusionen_US
dc.typeConference Objecten_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, Mühendislik Fakültesi, Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume13025 LNCSen_US
dc.identifier.startpage37en_US
dc.identifier.endpage48en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000767965300004en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85118159561en_US
dc.institutionauthorÇaşkurlu, Buğra-
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-030-89543-3_4-
dc.authorscopusid35104543000-
dc.authorscopusid55711260700-
dc.authorscopusid55908061300-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryKonferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2-
item.openairetypeConference Object-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
Appears in Collections:Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü / Department of Computer Engineering
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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