Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7534
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dc.contributor.authorMumcu, Ayşe-
dc.contributor.authorSağlam, İsmail-
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-11T15:57:39Z-
dc.date.available2021-09-11T15:57:39Z-
dc.date.issued2021-
dc.identifier.issn0219-1989-
dc.identifier.issn1793-6675-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198920500152-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/7534-
dc.description.abstractWe consider strategic issues in one-to-one matching with externalities. We show that no core (stable) mechanism is strategy-proof, extending an impossibility result of [Roth, A. E. [1982] The economics of matching: Stability and incentives, Math. Oper. Res. 7(4), 617-628] obtained in the absence of externalities. Moreover, we show that there are no limits on successful manipulation of preferences by coalitions of men and women, in contrast with the result of [Demange, G., Gale, D. and Sotomayor, M. [1987] A further note on the stable matching problem, Discrete Appl. Math. 16(3), 217-222] obtained in the absence of externalities.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipTurkish Academy of Sciences, in the framework of Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBA-GEBIP)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors have no conflicts of interests to declare. An early draft of this paper was written while the second author received financial support from Turkish Academy of Sciences, in the framework of Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBA-GEBIP). The usual disclaimer applies.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherWorld Scientific Publ Co Pte Ltden_US
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Game Theory Reviewen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectone-to-one matchingen_US
dc.subjectexternalitiesen_US
dc.subjectstabilityen_US
dc.subjectstrategic manipulationen_US
dc.titleStrategic Issues in One-To Matching With Externalitiesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümüen_US
dc.identifier.volume23en_US
dc.identifier.issue2en_US
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000671341300005-
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85096643478-
dc.institutionauthorSağlam, İsmail-
dc.identifier.doi10.1142/S0219198920500152-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ4-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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