Dividedness, Institutions and Economic Performance: a Cross-National Analysis of Democratic Stability

Abstract

Why divided societies face particular obstacles in maintaining democracy is one of the most challenging questions posed in the literature. Several studies posit that ethnically, religiously, and linguistically divided societies are incapable of establishing and holding a democratic system because of their social divisions and institutional weaknesses. We challenge this argument and examine whether political institutional arrangements (constraints over the executive, geographic distribution of political power, and form of government) in addition to economic performance are the crucial factors of success to establish and sustain a democratic regime and social unity in divided states. We use the Quality of Governance time-series standard dataset to test this hypothesis. By analyzing data on 163 states (1960-2012) we find that institutional constraints imposed over the executive and economic performance are the two primary influential factors in sustaining democratic regimes in multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious societies.