Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/6363
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dc.contributor.authorAkyol, Ethem-
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-11T15:36:02Z-
dc.date.available2021-09-11T15:36:02Z-
dc.date.issued2021en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765-
dc.identifier.issn1873-7374-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109845-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/6363-
dc.description.abstractWe consider second-price auctions with participation costs and investigate the revenue effects of a resale possibility. There are two potential bidders whose valuations are independently and identically distributed, and each bidder must incur a participation cost to bid in the auction. Due to these costs, there may be a resale opportunity in an otherwise efficient second-price auction. We show that when values are drawn from a uniform distribution, resale increases (decreases) entry of the lower-(higher-)cost bidder and decreases the original seller's expected revenue. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherElsevier Science Saen_US
dc.relation.ispartofEconomics Lettersen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectSecond-price auctionsen_US
dc.subjectResaleen_US
dc.subjectParticipation costen_US
dc.subjectExpected revenueen_US
dc.titleCan Resale Harm the Original Seller in a Second-Price Auction?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentFaculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economicsen_US
dc.departmentFakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümütr_TR
dc.identifier.volume203en_US
dc.authorid0000-0002-2014-7152-
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000651119700011en_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85104090289en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109845-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ2-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.grantfulltextnone-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics
Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection
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