Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/12149
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dc.contributor.authorSaglam, I.-
dc.date.accessioned2025-03-22T20:56:06Z-
dc.date.available2025-03-22T20:56:06Z-
dc.date.issued2025-
dc.identifier.issn0143-6570-
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1002/mde.4501-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/12149-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we investigate price stickiness in a dual-channel supply chain where a manufacturer sells its product directly through an online retailer and indirectly through an offline retailer. We construct a noncooperative game where the manufacturer and the offline retailer decide whether or not to costlessly adjust their prices after a demand shock. If the demand shock is positive, then no price can be sticky at the unique Nash equilibrium. If the demand shock is negative, then we additionally observe equilibria where some or all prices can be sticky. We also show that no equilibrium is always Pareto optimal. © 2025 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherJohn Wiley and Sons Ltden_US
dc.relation.ispartofManagerial and Decision Economicsen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessen_US
dc.subjectOnline Retailingen_US
dc.subjectPrice Adjustmenten_US
dc.subjectPrice Stickinessen_US
dc.subjectSupply Chainen_US
dc.titlePrice Stickiness in a Dual-Channel Supply Chainen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.departmentTOBB University of Economics and Technologyen_US
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85216985025-
dc.institutionauthorSaglam, I.-
dc.identifier.doi10.1002/mde.4501-
dc.authorscopusid6506812060-
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanıen_US
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ3-
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ2-
item.fulltextNo Fulltext-
item.languageiso639-1en-
item.openairecristypehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf-
item.cerifentitytypePublications-
item.openairetypeArticle-
item.grantfulltextnone-
crisitem.author.dept04.01. Department of Economics-
Appears in Collections:Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection
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