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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1117
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Gürdal, Mehmet Y. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Özdoğan Atabay, Ayça | - |
dc.contributor.author | Sağlam, İsmail | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-05-23T05:53:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-05-23T05:53:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-06 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Gurdal, M. Y., Ozdogan, A., & Saglam, I. (2014). Truth-telling and trust in sender–receiver games with intervention: an experimental study. Review of Economic Design, 18(2), 83-103. | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1434-4742 | |
dc.identifier.other | number of pages 21 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0155-9 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/1117 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in sender-receiver games. We show that this phenomenon is robust to the random intervention of a truthful regulator. In addition, intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers while the overall percentage of truthful messages received does not change much with or without intervention. We offer a theoretical explanation for the behavior of senders and receivers, using a logit agent quantal response equilibrium (logit-AQRE) model incorporating a non-monetary lying cost for senders (like Peeters et al. in Scand J Econ 115(2):508-548, 2013). We show that our experimental findings are all consistent with the predictions of this model. Moreover, we find that the lying cost is significantly higher under intervention, implying that truthful intervention is beneficial for receivers and justified as a tool for policy makers acting on behalf of informationally inferior parties. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer Heidelberg | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Review Of Economic Design | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | intervention | en_US |
dc.subject | sender-receiver game | en_US |
dc.subject | trust | en_US |
dc.subject | truth-telling | en_US |
dc.subject | strategic information transmission | en_US |
dc.title | Truth-Telling and Trust in Sender-Receiver Games With Intervention: an Experimental Study | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.department | Faculties, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Economics | en_US |
dc.department | Fakülteler, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İktisat Bölümü | tr_TR |
dc.identifier.volume | 18 | |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | |
dc.identifier.startpage | 83 | |
dc.identifier.endpage | 103 | |
dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000336405600001 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-84901319218 | en_US |
dc.institutionauthor | Özdoğan Atabay, Ayça | - |
dc.institutionauthor | Sağlam, İsmail | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10058-013-0155-9 | - |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusquality | Q1 | - |
item.openairetype | Article | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
item.grantfulltext | none | - |
item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
crisitem.author.dept | 04.01. Department of Economics | - |
crisitem.author.dept | 04.01. Department of Economics | - |
Appears in Collections: | İktisat Bölümü / Department of Economics Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection |
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