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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/10332
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Sağlam, İsmail | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-04-16T10:00:18Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-04-16T10:00:18Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0167-6377 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1872-7468 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2023.01.001 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11851/10332 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper characterizes conditions for two-player bargaining problems and bargaining rules under which unilateral pre-donation always yields Pareto utility gains. The paper also computes the optimal pre -donation of each player under the class of proportional bargaining rules.(c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartof | Operations Research Letters | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Cooperative bargaining | en_US |
dc.subject | Pre -donation | en_US |
dc.subject | Pareto gains | en_US |
dc.subject | Proportional rules | en_US |
dc.title | Two-Player Bargaining Problems With Unilateral Pre-Donation | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.department | TOBB ETÜ | en_US |
dc.identifier.volume | 51 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | en_US |
dc.identifier.startpage | 123 | en_US |
dc.identifier.endpage | 127 | en_US |
dc.identifier.wos | WOS:000923322000001 | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85146438355 | en_US |
dc.institutionauthor | … | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.orl.2023.01.001 | - |
dc.authorwosid | Saglam, Ismail/GLT-2744-2022 | - |
dc.authorscopusid | 6506812060 | - |
dc.relation.publicationcategory | Makale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı | en_US |
dc.identifier.scopusquality | Q2 | - |
item.openairetype | Article | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
item.grantfulltext | none | - |
item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
crisitem.author.dept | 04.01. Department of Economics | - |
Appears in Collections: | Scopus İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / Scopus Indexed Publications Collection WoS İndeksli Yayınlar Koleksiyonu / WoS Indexed Publications Collection |
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