

THE ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM AND THE
SOLIDARITY-BASED COLLECTIVE ACTION INTENTIONS OF THE LOCAL
COMMUNITY ON BEHALF OF SYRIANS: THE MODERATING ROLE OF IN-
GROUP IMAGE THREAT

GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

TOBB UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY

EGESU YILDIRIMKANLI

MIGRATION STUDIES

MASTER OF ARTS

AUGUST 2023

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Prof. Serdar SAYAN
Director of the Graduate
School of Social Sciences

This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that it in my opinion is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the Degree of Master of Arts in the field of Migration Studies at the Graduate School of Social Sciences.

Thesis Advisors

Asst. Prof. Suzan CEYLAN BATUR
(TOBB ETU, Psychology)

Assoc. Prof. Sinan ALPER
(Yaşar University, Psychology)

Thesis Committee Members

Asst. Prof. Zafer ÖZKAN
(Ordu University, Psychology)

Asst. Prof. Gülriz ŞEN
(TOBB ETU, Political Science and International Relations)

Asst. Prof. Yeşim ÜZÜMCÜOĞLU ZİHNİ
(TOBB ETU, Psychology)

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic traditions and the rules of ethical conduct. I also declare that I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work, as required by these traditions and the rules of ethical conduct.

Egesu YILDIRIMKANLI

ABSTRACT

THE ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN COLLECTIVE NARCISSISM AND THE SOLIDARITY-BASED COLLECTIVE ACTION INTENTIONS OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY ON BEHALF OF SYRIANS: THE MODERATING ROLE OF IN-GROUP IMAGE THREAT

YILDIRIMKANLI, Egesu

Master of Arts, Migration Studies

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Suzan CEYLAN BATUR

Co-Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Sinan ALPER

This thesis investigates the relationship between collective narcissism (CN) and the local community's intentions to engage in solidarity-based collective action (SBCA) on behalf of Syrian refugees in Türkiye, focusing on the role of in-group image threat. The hypotheses were tested using an online survey and with an experimental setup embedded in the survey. The data was analyzed based on the responses of 319 participants (210 Female, 105 Male, $M_{age} = 22.4$) who identified themselves as Turkish since the study's independent variable is Turkishness-based national collective narcissism. The results revealed that higher CN scores were associated with lower intentions for SBCA. Findings also showed that under the in-group praise condition, participants demonstrated a significantly greater willingness to engage in SBCA compared to those under the in-group criticism condition. However, although the manipulation of in-group image threat had a significant impact on SBCA intentions, it did not moderate the relationship between CN and SBCA intentions. Consistencies or differences with previous studies and potential reasons for the discrepancies were discussed. Contributions and potential limitations were also presented.

Keywords: Solidarity-based Collective Action, Collective Narcissism, In-group Image Threat, Syrian Refugees

ÖZ

KOLEKTİF NARSİZM VE YEREL TOPLUMUN SURİYELİLER ADINA DAYANIŞMA TEMELLİ TOPLU EYLEME KATILIM NİYETLERİ ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ: İÇ-GRUP İMAJİ TEHDİDİNİN DÜZENLEYİCİ ROLÜ

YILDIRIMKANLI, Egesu

Yüksek Lisans, Göç Çalışmaları

Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Suzan CEYLAN BATUR

İkinci Tez Danışmanı: Doç Dr. Sinan ALPER

Bu tez, Türkiye'deki yerel toplumun Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik dayanışma temelli kolektif eyleme (DTKE) katılım niyeti ile kolektif narsisizm (KN) arasındaki ilişkiyi ve iç-grup imajı tehdidinin bu ilişkideki rolünü incelemektedir. Hipotezler, çevrimiçi bir anket ve anket içine gömülü deneysel bir düzenek kullanılarak test edilmiştir. Veriler, çalışmanın bağımsız değişkeni Türklüğe-dayalı ulusal kolektif narsisizm olduğu için kendini Türk olarak ifade eden 319 katılımcının (210 Kadın, 105 Erkek, *Ort.yaş* =22.4) yanıtlarına dayalı olarak analiz edilmiştir. Sonuçlar, daha yüksek KN skorlarının daha düşük DTKE niyetleriyle ilişkili olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Bulgular ayrıca iç-grup övgü koşulu altında, katılımcıların iç-grup eleştiri koşulu altındakilere kıyasla DTKE'ye daha büyük bir isteklilik gösterdiğini göstermiştir. Bununla birlikte, iç grup imaj tehdidinin manipülasyonunun DTKE niyetleri üzerinde önemli bir etkisi olmasına rağmen, KN ile DTKE niyetleri arasındaki ilişkiyi düzenlememiştir. Çalışmanın tartışma kısmında; önceki çalışmalarla tutarlılıklar veya farklılıklar sunulurken, farklılıkların potansiyel nedenleri tartışılmıştır. Ayrıca katkılar ve potansiyel sınırlamalar da sunulmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dayanışma Temelli Kolektif Eylem, Kolektif Narsisizm, İç-grup İmajı Tehdidi, Suriyeli Mülteciler

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor Asst. Prof. Suzan Ceylan Batur and my co-supervisor Assoc. Prof. Sinan Alper for their valuable guidance and support on this journey. Their expertise and encouragement have supported me in shaping the course of this research. I am also deeply grateful to my family and friends for their unwavering love and encouragement. Their presence has been a constant source of motivation and strength.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM PAGE.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
LIST OF FIGURES.....	x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	xi
CHAPTER I.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Situation Overview of Syrians in Türkiye and the General Context.....	2
1.2. The Intergroup Conflict Between Syrians and The Local Community in Türkiye.....	5
CHAPTER II.....	11
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	11
2.1. Collective Action.....	11
2.1.a. Solidarity-based Collective Action.....	14
2.1.b. Key Factors Associated with Collective Action Intentions.....	16
2.1.b.i. Identity.....	17
2.1.b.ii. Morality.....	20
2.1.b.iii. Efficacy.....	21
2.1.b.iv. Perceived Injustice and Anger.....	22
2.1.b.v. Intergroup Contact.....	23
2.1.b.vi. Political Orientation and Religiosity.....	25
2.1.b.vii. Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation.....	25
2.1.b.viii. Privilege Awareness.....	26
2.2. Collective Narcissism.....	27
2.3. The Current Study.....	32
2.3.a. The Subject and the Scope of the Thesis.....	32
2.3.b. The Purpose of the Thesis and the Problem.....	32
2.3.c. The Significance of the Subject and Contribution of the Current Research.....	34

CHAPTER III	37
METHOD.....	37
3.1. Participants	37
3.2. Materials.....	39
3.2.a. In-group Image Threat	39
3.2.b. Manipulation Check Question	40
3.2.c. Solidarity-based Collective Action Intentions	41
3.2.c.i. Imaginary Scenario: A Discriminatory Decision Towards Syrians	41
3.2.d. Collective Narcissism Scale.....	41
3.2.e. Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale.....	42
3.2.f. Social Dominance Orientation Scale.....	42
3.2.g. Intergroup Threat Scale	42
3.2.h. Turkish Identification Scale.....	43
3.2.i. Demographic Information Form.....	43
3.3. Procedure.....	44
3.4. Analysis Plan	45
CHAPTER IV	49
RESULTS	49
4.1. Manipulation Check	49
4.2. Correlations	50
4.3. Findings Related to In-group Image Threat Manipulation.....	51
4.4. Model Testing.....	51
CHAPTER V.....	53
DISCUSSION	53
5.1. Overview of the Results	53
5.2. The Study's Contributions, Implications, and Constraints	56
5.3. Directions for Further Research	60
CHAPTER VI	63
CONCLUSION	63
BIBLIOGRAPHY	65
APPENDICES	81

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations between Measures50



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3.1. Images in In-group Praise Condition	40
Figure 3.2. Images in In-group Criticism Condition (Reverse Order)	40
Figure 4.1. Moderation Model	52



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CN	: Collective Narcissism
EU	: European Union
IOM	: International Organization for Migration
ISIS	: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
PMM	: Presidency of Migration Management
RWA	: Right-Wing Authoritarianism
SBCA	: Solidarity-based Collective Action
SDO	: Social Dominance Orientation
UN	: United Nations
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
CHP	: Republican People's Party
ZP	: Victory Party
AKP	: Justice and Development Party
IYIP	: Good Party
SIMCA	: Social Identity Model of Collective Action
EMSICA	: Encapsulated Model of Social Identity in Collective Action
SIT	: Social Identity Theory

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of migration has been a significant social, economic, and political event throughout history. People have migrated to different places for various reasons, leaving their countries behind (Hürriyetoğlu 2019). Migration can take place on various scales, from individual movements to large-scale migration triggered by events like war or natural disasters (Aksoy 2012). Moreover, migration is a complex and diverse phenomenon involving populations with different motivations, not limited to a single cause. One of the key distinctions between migrations is whether they are driven by voluntary choice or forced circumstances. People can be forced to flee their homes because of various factors such as wars, regional conflicts, political instability within a country, and natural disasters (Becker and Ferrara 2019).

The internal unrest that began in Syria in 2011 as a result of the Arab Spring had dramatic effects, leading the country into a civil war and forcing many people to flee their homes. Syrian people who had to leave their country were welcomed in Türkiye through an open-door policy (Kirişçi 2014). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Türkiye is the country that hosts the highest number of Syrian refugees among all countries (World Migration Report 2022). This mass migration has profound effects on the lives of both the Syrian migrants and the local community in Türkiye. The local community in Türkiye holds a significant perception of both realistic and symbolic threats regarding Syrians (Erdoğan 2021; Ipsos 2022). Research findings indicate that the local community has a very limited willingness to enhance Syrians' access to social and civil rights and eliminate their existing or potential social disadvantages (Erdoğan 2021). The attitudes of the local community towards refugees facilitate the process of their integration and social cohesion within the society. Moreover, the local community taking action to improve the disadvantaged positions of refugees paves the way for a more equitable and just society, where access to basic rights and social justice is strengthened (Brown 2002; Acar and Uluğ 2016; Uluğ and Acar 2018; Uluğ, Solak, and Acar 2022).

The focus of this thesis is the intentions of the local community in Türkiye to engage in collective action based on solidarity in support of Syrian refugees. This thesis aims to examine the local community's intentions of collective action engagement based on solidarity with Syrian refugees in Türkiye. The objective is to investigate how collective narcissism (CN) influences the local community's intentions for solidarity-based collective action (SBCA) and the role of in-group image threat in the relationship between CN and these intentions.

Chapter I gives a situation overview of Syrians in Türkiye and in general, as well as the intergroup conflict between Syrians and the local community in Türkiye. Chapter II presents the theoretical background and the conceptual framework of the study. Chapter III focuses on the study's methodological framework, while Chapter IV explores the results. Chapter V provides a discussion of the findings of the study in the context of previous research. The study's contributions, implications, and limitations are also presented in Chapter V while the conclusion of the thesis is presented in Chapter VI.

1.1. Situation Overview of Syrians in Türkiye and the General Context

The Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and spread to many Arab countries, is one of the prominent social movements of the twenty-first century. With the uprising movement that began in Tunisia when a university graduate named Mohammed Bouazizi burned himself on fire owing to unemployment and economic hardships, an era of violent upheaval began in the Arab world. After Tunisia, there have been widespread upheavals in Algeria, Yemen, Jordan, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Mauritania, Oman, Iraq, Morocco, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. The Arab Spring is a movement of uprising led by the Arab community opposing their rulers in response to their calls for freedom, democracy, and justice (Sağsen 2011). Many countries affected by the Arab Spring have experienced political or governmental change as a result of these protests. The government of Bashar al-Assad, in contrast to other governments, responded strongly to the demonstrations in Syria, and as a result, no progress or change has taken place there (Orhan 2013).

The Syrian Civil War stands as one of the most significant repercussions of the Arab Spring. What initially began as peaceful demonstrations in Daraa province of Syria in 2011 quickly escalated into a full-blown civil war when President Bashar al-Assad responded with strong suppression actions. A catastrophic civil war broke out in the country as a result of the massive demonstrations and the government trying to suppress it, taking Syria into disorder and chaos. As a result, the conflict within the country quickly evolved into a multi-actor civil war (Özdemir 2016). Both the Syrian people and the Turkish government initially assumed that the crisis in Syria was temporary. This impression resulted from the idea that the Assad government's increasing use of violence would soon cause the regime to fall (Erdoğan 2020). Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a new participant in the conflict, however, increased the number of parties involved and broadened the scope of the regional conflict. As a result, more people were compelled to leave their homes to seek protection in various countries (Kirişçi 2014, 35).

It has been 12 since the civil war in Syria started. However, the Syrian civil war has not yet come to an end. Over the 12 years, the conflict has persisted, resulting in the loss of countless lives, millions of injuries, the separation of families, and the displacement of millions of Syrians. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of June 2023, more than 15 million Syrians are currently under the requirement for protection and humanitarian assistance. Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, describes the conflict in Syria as “the greatest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time” (Erdoğan 2021, 22). Before the war, Syria's population was approximately 22 million, and over half of the population had been displaced as a consequence of the conflict. Internally, 6.8 million Syrians have been uprooted from their homes, while Syria's neighboring countries Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Türkiye host 5.28 million Syrians (UNHCR 2023).

The repercussions of the Syrian conflict have extended far beyond the borders of the country, significantly impacting the lives of individuals in various parts of the world. Türkiye, in particular, has been heavily affected by the crisis as it followed an open-door policy, providing refuge to those fleeing the Assad regime and Syrian civilians (Kirişçi 2014, 5). Türkiye hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees (IOM 2020, 40), with over

3.4 million registered refugees residing within its borders (Presidency of Migration Management; PMM 2023). The total number of Syrians living in Türkiye has been estimated to be nearly 4.5 million when undocumented Syrians are taken into consideration (Çirakoğlu, Demirutku, and Karakaya 2020).

Türkiye has implemented a policy concerning the legal status of Syrians residing in the country since it could not receive individual applications for international protection of Syrians who came to the country en masse (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior 2014, Erdoğan 2021, 29). As part of this policy, the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Türkiye issued the Temporary Protection Regulation in October 2014, granting Syrians in Türkiye a legal status of "temporary protection". Temporary protection is the status given to persons who cross the borders of Türkiye collectively or individually, with massive influxes from the Syrian Arab Republic, but whose international protection request cannot be considered individually (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior 2014). However, from a sociological perspective, Syrians residing in Türkiye are often referred to as refugees. According to the definition of refugee, individuals are considered refugees when they face persecution or have a legitimate fear of persecution based on their membership in a particular social group or their political beliefs, and they are forced to leave their home country and are unable to safely return (Loescher, Betts, and Milner 2008). Therefore, in this study, despite Syrians having the legal status of temporary protection, they were referred to as refugees.

The percentage of registered Syrians across the overall population of Türkiye stands at 3.93% (Turkish Statistical Institute 2022; PMM 2023). However, the proportion of Syrians in the local population varies across different provinces. Kilis has the highest proportion with %33.6, followed by Gaziantep at 17%, Hatay at 15.8%, and Şanlıurfa at 13.45%. In terms of numbers, Istanbul hosts the largest Syrian population with 531 thousand individuals, followed by Gaziantep with 439 thousand Syrians, while Hatay and Şanlıurfa provinces also have over 300 thousand registered Syrian refugees each (PMM 2023). A small proportion, approximately two percent, of Syrians covered by temporary protection stay in Temporary Accommodation Centers, whereas the vast majority of them live in rural and urban regions (PMM 2023). Considering these figures, it becomes evident

that fostering harmonious coexistence with the local population and reducing intergroup conflicts have become increasingly significant issues.

1.2. The Intergroup Conflict Between Syrians and The Local Community in Türkiye

Another important issue regarding Syrians in Türkiye is the attitude of the local community towards them. In his Syrians Barometer study, the last of which he conducted in 2021, Murat Erdoğan examined the approaches and attitudes of the local community in Türkiye towards Syrians from 2017 to 2021 (Erdoğan 2021). The results of this study reveal that there is a lack of social acceptance towards Syrians in Türkiye, and the social acceptance by the local population has decreased from 2017 to 2021. In the survey conducted in this study in 2021, nearly half (49.7%) of the participants from the local community expressed the belief that Syrian refugees should be sent back, regardless of the security conditions in Syria. On the other hand, in the study conducted in 2017, the percentage of those who advocated that Syrians should be sent back to Syria regardless of the circumstances was 11.5%, which increased to 25% in 2019 and 48% in 2020. These findings show that beliefs regarding the return of Syrians to Syria have strengthened in recent years among the local community (Erdoğan 2021, 159). Furthermore, considering the perception of the local community regarding the integration and coexistence with Syrians, it is evident that there is a very weak willingness to live together and a lack of belief in the possibility of coexisting peacefully. Among the participants, 78% believe that peaceful coexistence with Syrians is not possible (Erdoğan 2021, 161).

When examining how the local community in Türkiye defines Syrians, it was observed that approximately 40% of the participants expressed the belief that “Syrians are dangerous individuals who will cause significant problems in the future and create both social and economic hardships in our country”. They also perceive them as a burden on the local community (Erdoğan 2021, 103). Moreover, when asked to what extent Syrians have adapted to Turkish society/Türkiye, about half of the respondents from the local community answered "not at all", while 25% of them answered “very little”. In other words, a significant portion of the local community believes that Syrians have not adapted to Turkish society (Erdoğan 2021, 165).

According to another finding of the Syrian Barometer 2021, it is observed that the local community in Türkiye has a high perception of both realistic and symbolic threats toward Syrians (Erdoğan 2021, 136). Approximately 70% of the participants believe that Syrians will harm the country's economy and result in a decrease in the quantity and quality of public services, while 60% think that Syrians will take away job opportunities from the local population. These findings indicate a realistic perception of the threat toward Syrians. On the other hand, about 70% of the participants believe that Syrians will damage Türkiye's social and cultural structure, disrupt social harmony, and distort the identity of the Turkish community. These findings point out the perception of the symbolic threat toward Syrian refugees among the local community in Türkiye. It is also observed that in regions where the proportion of Syrians is high across the local population, the acceptance of Syrians by the local community is lower, and there is a higher level of anxiety when compared with other regions (Erdoğan 2021, 318).

Furthermore, approximately 30% of the survey participants believe that Syrian refugees do not like the Turkish community and exploit it (Erdoğan 2021, 318). Studies in the literature on this topic indicate that hostile attribution (i.e., the tendency to interpret confusing or unfavorable actions of members of the outgroup as intentionally hostile) can influence individuals' attitudes towards outgroups, leading to enhanced hostility and harmful stereotypes (Dyduch-Hazar, Mrozinski, and Golec de Zavala 2019).

2021 Altındağ Incidents can be given as an important instance of the intergroup conflict between Syrians and the local community in Türkiye. On August 10, 2021, in the Altındağ district of Ankara, accumulated social anger between Syrian refugees and the local population was ignited. The events unfolded following an altercation between a group of Syrians and two Turkish youths, which resulted in the stabbing of the two Turkish youths by the Syrian group, tragically resulting in the loss of one young life. Subsequently, large groups of residents organized protests, attacked the homes and shops of Syrians, and even set some shops on fire. The Altındağ incidents stand as a critical event that vividly illustrates the tension between Syrian refugees and the local population. These events further emphasized the complexity of the Syrian refugee issue in Türkiye and its potential societal consequences.

One of the research topics of Erdoğan's study was how willing the local community in Türkiye is to increase Syrian refugees' access to social and civil rights in Türkiye and improve the overall disadvantages they face in society. When looking at the opinions of the local community in Türkiye about the Syrians' access to the right to work, it can be seen that 43% of the survey participants believe that Syrians should not be granted work permits (Erdoğan 2021, 149). These results demonstrate that the local community members have concerns about potentially losing their jobs if Syrians are allowed to work. Moreover, when examining the local community's views regarding the access of Syrians to education services, only 30% of the survey participants advocate for Syrian children to benefit from the right to education. On the other hand, approximately 15% of the participants stated that Syrian children should not receive any form of education (Erdoğan 2021, 180). Furthermore, the results of the survey regarding the opinions of the local community about civil rights and citizenship issues related to Syrians demonstrate that participants have serious objections to granting political rights and citizenship to Syrians, despite nearly 90% of the participants expressing the opinion that at least half of the Syrians will stay in Türkiye. The majority of survey respondents -nearly 70%- agree that no Syrian should be given Turkish citizenship (Erdoğan 2021, 175-176). The results indicate that the local community in Türkiye, which is in relatively favorable condition, has a limited willingness to enhance the current or potential disadvantages experienced by Syrian refugees.

As a retrospective example of this, the opinions of the local community in Türkiye about a discriminatory decision taken by a local government can be stated. In July 2021, Bolu Mayor Tanju Özcan announced that foreigners living in the city would be charged higher fees for services such as water, electricity, and official transactions. The main aim of this decision targeting Syrian refugees was to ensure their departure from the city (Euronews Turkish 2021a). In Erdoğan's study (2021), approximately 30% of the respondents stated that they find it acceptable for some municipalities to charge higher fees for services such as water, electricity, gas, and official transactions from refugees in Türkiye (Erdoğan 2021, 178). An openly discriminatory decision taken by a municipality in previous years and the opinions of the local community regarding this decision indicate that the local community has low intentions of solidarity towards Syrian refugees.

Another research that revealed some important results about the attitudes toward refugees in Türkiye was the survey conducted by Ipsos with participants from 28 countries in 2022. In the survey, participants were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement "The majority of refugees coming to the country are not actual refugees, but they come for financial reasons or to benefit from social assistance." Türkiye ranked as the second-highest country among 28 countries, with 73% of participants agreeing with this statement (Ipsos 2022, 8). Respondents were also asked to what extent they agreed with the statement "The country's borders should be completely closed to refugees". Türkiye ranked as the highest country among 28 countries, with 76% of participants expressing the highest level of agreement with this statement (Ipsos 2022, 10). Furthermore, participants were also asked to what extent they agreed with the statement "Allowing refugees to work in the local country helps them integrate into society." Türkiye ranked as the highest country among 28 countries, with 46% of participants expressing the highest level of disagreement with this statement (Ipsos 2022, 22). Participants were also asked about any actions they had undertaken within the past year to support refugees. 76% of participants from Türkiye stated that they had not taken any action to support refugees within a year. With this percentage, Türkiye ranked as the second least supportive country out of the 28 countries (Ipsos 2022, 30). It is important to emphasize that public opinion on the issue of refugees can be influenced by various factors, including security concerns (Erdoğan 2021, 90-92), socioeconomic pressures, and perceived strain on public resources (Piotrowski 2019, 2).

From another perspective, when examining the rhetoric of the Turkish government towards Syrian refugees, a shift can be observed over time. Along with the Turkish administration adopting an "open door" policy at the very beginning of the process, it also adopted inclusive language, referring to Syrian refugees as "our guests" and "Muslim brothers". However, the government's rhetoric regarding Syrian refugees has shifted with time. One example of that was President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's signaling a shift from a "religious fellowship" discourse to a more pragmatic perspective after he criticized the United Nations (UN) and European Union's (EU) insufficient financial assistance for refugees in 2016 (BBC Turkish 2016). Additionally, in 2020, following the attack in Idlib, Syria that claimed the lives of 34 Turkish soldiers, Türkiye declared that they would no

longer adhere to the Türkiye-EU Deal and that they would not stop refugees from crossing the European border (Karataş 2020). This was also an action that may be referred to as the "pushing forward" of refugees (Akdeniz 2020).

Another event that greatly contributed to the politicization of the refugee issue in Türkiye was the process leading up to the 2023 Turkish General Elections (Erdoğan 2021, 319). In May 2023, the general election took place in Türkiye. Before the elections, the refugee issue took center stage in the election agenda of the major opposition parties. Türkiye's largest opposition party Republican People's Party (CHP) and the other opposition parties such as the Good Party (İYİP) and the Victory Party (ZP), which was initially established with the promise of sending all refugees back (Al Jazeera 2022), adopted a strict stance on the refugee issue and heavily criticized President Erdoğan, using the refugee policy as a justification. İYİP leader Akşener advocated for rebuilding relations with the Bashar al-Assad regime to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees (Euronews Turkish 2022; Al Jazeera 2022). The main opposition party, CHP, promised to create the necessary conditions for voluntary return to Syria within two years if they won the 2023 elections, including cooperation with the international community and investments in Syria (Euronews Turkish 2021b). It was previously predicted that the centralization of anti-refugee rhetoric in the lead-up to the election would not only escalate tension within society but also have a negative impact on the attitudes of Syrian refugees towards the local community and the state (Erdoğan 2021, 338). Therefore, it can be anticipated that the political opposition's use of such rhetoric may have significantly triggered anti-refugee attitudes among the local community in Türkiye.

The current situation in Syria and the experiences in Türkiye over the past 12 years indicate that a significant number of Syrians will continue to live in Türkiye. As a result, both the Turkish and Syrian communities should be ready for coexistence. The prolonged stay of Syrians in Türkiye, coupled with factors such as the politicization of the refugee issue and economic challenges, reveals a generally negative attitude towards refugees among the local community. The local community has a high perception of both realistic and symbolic threats and shows low levels of solidarity intentions toward refugees. These factors contribute to increased social tensions between refugees and the local community

(Erdoğan 2021, 336-358). Studies in the literature demonstrate that the attitude of the local community toward refugees plays a crucial role in the successful integration and coexistence of diverse groups (Berry 1997). On the other hand, it is well-known that social exclusion strengthens migrants' hostile attitudes toward the local community and can lead to higher crime rates and the potential for radicalization, including involvement in terrorist groups (Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015). In this context, understanding the attitudes of the local community towards refugees is extremely valuable since it can guide both macro and local-level policymakers in the construction of successful integration policies and ensuring the coexistence of different cultures.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Collective Action

Collective action is a subject that is studied by different disciplines. Therefore, how collective actions are defined and handled may differ by discipline. This thesis discusses the concept of collective action from a social-psychological perspective. Wright and colleagues (1990) defined collective action as any behavior performed by a person to improve the conditions of the group he/she belongs to. According to this definition, the individual's identification with a particular group and performing collective action to improve this group's current position is necessary for a behavior to be called a collective action. In addition, individuals do not need to participate in an action in crowds on the streets for a behavior to be called a collective action. For example, an action that people will take through social media to achieve a certain collective goal can also be considered a collective action (Van Zomeren 2013).

Wright and colleagues (1990) have examined the possible reactions of members of disadvantaged groups to the unfair circumstances those groups experience, and they have organized them into three main categories. These various behavioral responses to an unfair position of the group have diverse social consequences as well as diverse psychological antecedents.

- 1) To act or not to act: The internalization and acceptance of unfair conditions by members of disadvantaged groups, as well as their lack of individual or collective action to change these conditions, is described as inaction. Individuals can choose inaction as well as take action.
- 2) Individual or collective actions: Individual and collective actions are the subject of the second distinction. This distinction is not made based on the number of people participating in the action. If the person aims to improve his/her conditions by removing himself/herself from the disadvantaged group identity, this is called individual action. However, if a person aims to improve the conditions of the group

by taking action on behalf of the whole group, this is called collective action. The type of action under investigation in this study is collective, not individual, as it examines actions aimed at benefiting an entire group rather than individual improvement.

- 3) Normative and non-normative actions: The third distinction is made based on whether actions conform to existing norms or go against them. Actions that align with the norms of the current social order are referred to as normative actions, whereas actions that deviate from the boundaries of the existing social systems and norms are termed non-normative actions. The type of collective action examined in this study can be classified as a normative collective action because it does not deviate from the currently existing norms in Türkiye.

Throughout human history, it has been seen that collective actions have led to many social changes. There are examples of these social movements in the history of almost every country. Some examples of well-known collective actions across the world are The Civil Rights Movement in the United States between 1954 and 1968 sought to abolish institutional racial discrimination against black Americans (Hall 2005), the Black Lives Matter movement, which became more internationally visible with the protests following the death of George Floyd in 2020 (Olteanu, Weber, and Gatica-Perez 2016), The anti-government protests called the Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia in 2010 and spread to almost the entire Arab world, stemming from the Arab people's demands for democracy, freedom, and human rights (Ardic 2012).

A more recent example from the world is the protests that started in Iran in 2022 over the death of Mahsa Amini. On 13 September 2022, Mehsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman in Iran, was detained by the morality police for not wearing a headscarf "properly". Mehsa was taken to the intensive care unit after detention and passed away three days later. Authorities claimed that Mehsa had a heart attack while in custody, but her family stated that Mehsa did not have any health problems. With the death of Mahsa Amini, the long-accumulated social anger in Iran, especially the anger of women, sparked and protests have arisen across Iran (Şen 2022). These protests spread outside Iran and solidarity actions with Iranian women were held in different countries such as Türkiye,

Japan, Chile, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and the USA. Protestors not only took to the streets but also shared widespread posts on social media and carried out strong symbolic actions, where they burned their hijabs and cut their hair, in opposition to the oppressive regime and the compulsory head-covering policy in Iran (Euronews 2022). According to Norway-based Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO), as of April 4, 2023, at least 537 people including children and women were killed in the anti-government demonstrations (IHRNGO 2023).

Throughout its 100-year history, Türkiye has witnessed numerous collective actions in various forms and contexts as well (Uluğ, Solak, and Acar 2022, 4). One of the most well-known of these is the Gezi Park protests that started in Istanbul in 2013. The Gezi Park protests were considered a turning point in the history of social movements in Türkiye (Uysal and Akfırat 2022). The protests began to oppose the destruction of trees in Gezi Park in Taksim, Istanbul and later turned into reactions to both violations of human rights and police brutality. In total 3.5 million people participated in the protests nearly all over the country. (Gökçeçiçek et al. 2013; as cited in Uysal and Akfırat 2022).

In addition to the Gezi Park protests, the 2021 Boğaziçi University protests can be cited as a more recent example of collective action from Türkiye. The protests started with the appointment of Melih Bulu as the new rector of Boğaziçi University who is outside of the university, does not meet the academic credentials required for the position, and is also known for his closeness to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). In addition, the university's LGBTI+ Studies Club was shut down on the grounds that an LGBTIQ+ themed illustration made by the protestors insulted religious values, although the club has no connection with the work. Similar to the Gezi Park protests, the ongoing protests at Boğaziçi University turned into resistance to the authoritarian rule restricting basic human rights. These protests soon expanded with the support of academics, students from different universities, and various segments of society (Kasımoğlu and Mečiar 2021).

It is important to acknowledge that studies on social change generally focus their attention on social changes that are progressive and demand greater equality in society. However, there are also demands for social changes that would make the existing system more hierarchical and increase inequality between different groups such as demanding

stricter immigration policies or banning abortion (Becker 2020). This thesis particularly focuses on the intentions of collective actions that aim for progressive and egalitarian social change.

Today, collective actions are defined more inclusively beyond the definition provided by Wright and colleagues (1990). According to Wright and colleagues' definition of collective action, an action can be labeled as collective action if it aims to improve the conditions of the social group with which individuals identify themselves. However, individuals can participate in collective actions not only for the interests of their groups but also for other reasons. For example, studies have shown that social rewards, individual interests (Klandermans 1997), or emotions such as anger (e.g., Van Zomeren et al. 2004) can serve as motivating factors for participation in collective actions. Additionally, the advantaged groups' members can also engage in collective action to address the disadvantages faced by social groups to which they do not belong (e.g. Selvanathan et al. 2018; Van Zomeren 2013). This concept is referred to as solidarity-based collective action (SBCA) in the literature. Since the dependent variable of this thesis is SBCA rather than collective action in general, the following sections will discuss the literature on SBCA in detail.

2.1.a. Solidarity-based Collective Action

Studies on collective action predominantly examine the engagement of disadvantaged group members in collective action and investigate the various factors that are associated with their intentions to participate in such actions (Van Zomeren et al. 2011). The goal of previous research is to give an understanding of the motivations, social processes, and contextual factors that influence collective action involvement in disadvantaged groups. However, for collective actions to be effective and create social change, it is very important that people who are not in a disadvantaged position also take action (Subasic, Reynolds, and Tuner 2008). In the past decade, the collective action literature has increasingly focused on the participation of advantaged groups in collective action, a topic that was previously overlooked (Van Zomeren et al. 2011).

Many examples can be given of the engagement of advantaged group members in SBCA alongside disadvantaged group members. White Americans have also participated in and supported the Black Lives Matter movement, which emerged as a response to systemic racism and discrimination in the United States, showing their support for the fight against racial injustice experienced by mainly black Americans and other minorities (Selvanathan 2018). Moreover, the Mahsa Amini protests mentioned above, which spread to many countries around the world including Türkiye, serve as a more current example that people can engage in collective action not only to improve the conditions of their group but also for the interests of other groups. The support of women and men from more privileged backgrounds in various ways, to stand in solidarity with Iranian women who are facing disadvantaged and unjust conditions serves as an example of SBCA (Euronews 2022). Another instance of a SBCA is heterosexual and cisgender people (whose gender identity is appropriate to the assigned gender) who advocate for and aim to promote LGBTQ+ rights (e.g., Reimer et al. 2017).

There are also examples of solidarity actions with refugees in different parts of the world for the defense of refugee rights, respect for human rights, and protection of human values. In 2017, protests were held with the slogan "No Ban, No Wall" in opposition to former US President Trump's travel restrictions and the plan to build a wall on the Mexico border (The Local Germany 2017). Additionally, protests under the banner "Refugees Welcome" took place in various European cities, including Dublin, London, and Liverpool, to show support for refugees. In these actions, it was demanded that there should be no barriers such as walls at the borders and that refugees should be accepted (Independent 2023; ITV News Granada Reports 2023; Anadolu Agency 2023).

In Türkiye, protests by the local community in solidarity with refugees are not common. As an instance of that, on World Refugee Day, June 20, 2023, the "Birlikte Yaşamak İstiyoruz İnisiyatifi" (We Want to Live Together Initiative) organized a press statement in Istanbul, Türkiye. The initiative aimed to draw attention to the increasing hostility towards migrants in Türkiye and advocate for the rights of migrants, including access to insured employment, healthcare, housing, and education (@biraradayasamak, June 20, 2023).

2.1.b. Key Factors Associated with Collective Action Intentions

The question of why people participate in collective actions has been studied by many researchers from a social-psychological perspective, based on a variety of theoretical backgrounds. The theoretical approaches in the collective action literature have been classified initially into three categories under the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA); group identification, group efficacy beliefs, and group-based anger due to perceived injustice. (Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). Moreover, the Encapsulated Model of Social Identity in Collective Action (EMSICA), a model proposed by Thomas, Mavor, and McGarty (2012), highlights the significance of social identities formed through opinion-based groups in the initiation of collective actions. Van Zomeren (2013) has extended the SIMCA by including moral convictions in the model as the fourth fundamental motivation explaining the social psychology of collective action.

Recently, Agostini and Van Zomeren (2021) have compiled and integrated collective action studies into an integrated and cross-cultural framework known as the dual-chamber model. In this model they constructed, they placed the morality dimension at the center of collective action while verifying earlier findings on the other three fundamental dimensions of collective action (identity, efficacy, and anger motivated by perceived injustice), and aimed to incorporate potential cultural and other limitations into the model. Additionally, they have investigated whether the key motivations of the collective action can be generalized to the collective action participation of advantaged group members as well (Van Zomeren et al. 2011).

The main factors influencing collective action participation are not limited to these four factors (e.g., identity, efficacy, and anger motivated by perceived injustice). Other important factors were found to be associated with intentions of collective action engagement. One of the important factors found in the literature that influences participation intentions in collective action is intergroup contact, based on Allport's (1954) intergroup contact theory. Other factors found to influence collective action participation intentions are political beliefs (Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008), religiosity (Demirdağ and Hasta 2019; as cited in Uluğ, Solak, and Acar 2022), right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Çakal et al. 2016), and social dominance orientation (SDO; Stewart et al. 2016). It was

also found that privilege awareness is associated with advantaged group members' intentions of collective action participation based on solidarity with the disadvantaged (Uysal et al. 2022).

The following sections will discuss the fundamental predictors of collective action participation by both the disadvantaged and the advantaged group members, addressing the four key motivators of collective action as well as Allport's (1954) intergroup contact hypothesis, political orientation and religiosity dimensions, and privilege awareness.

2.1.b.i. Identity

In Social Identity Theory (SIT), it is claimed that individuals have a natural inclination to distinguish their groups from others in a positive manner. This inclination arises from the fact that their social identities are an integral part of their self-identities. By attributing positive qualities to their social groups, individuals also attribute positive qualities to themselves through this comparative process (Tajfel 1978). According to SIT, when individuals compare their social group to external out-groups and fail to attain a positive identity, they feel the need to cope with the negative value associated with their group. Several strategies exist, including both individual and collective strategies, that can be employed to successfully distinguish one's social identity favorably (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

One of these strategies is for members of underprivileged groups to depart from their current social group and join one that is more valued. The process of managing one's own identity is referred to as upward mobility. Social creativity is another identity management strategy. Comparing one's own lower-value in-group to other groups based on different aspects, comparing the group with another one considered as less privileged, and reconsidering an undesirable feature of the group to attribute it more worth are all examples of social creativity. Social creativity is a collective strategy to deal with the worthlessness of the in-group. Engaging in collective action is yet another collective strategy, wherein individuals actively participate in collective efforts to enhance the disadvantaged status of their group (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

In cases where permeability between group boundaries is possible, individuals can look for personal improvement and switch to the more privileged social group by using the individual mobility strategy rather than a collective strategy (Ellemers 2001). However, it is not always possible for permeability to exist between disadvantaged and privileged groups, and individual mobility may not be feasible or individuals may not desire to leave their social groups and transition to more advantageous groups. In such cases, individuals aim to acquire improvement at the group level by using collective strategies rather than individual ones (Ellemers 1993). However, social creativity and collective actions, perceived as collective strategies, have quite different implications in terms of challenging the status quo between groups. In social creativity strategies, the perspective of comparison between different groups is changed when the group to which one belongs is perceived as disadvantaged. Collective actions, on the other hand, directly try to improve the status of the group in the social hierarchy. It has been shown that adopting social creativity strategies has a negative effect on intentions to engage in collective actions. Since the socially disadvantaged position of the group is addressed in different ways when using social creativity strategies, intergroup inequality is not challenged (Becker 2012).

When coping with the negative value of the group, alternative identity management strategies (i.e. upward mobility and social creativity) are known to create a psychological barrier to participation in social movements. Furthermore, when coping with the low value of a social group, upward mobility, and social creativity strategies are less costly than engaging in collective action for an individual. This can be given as one of the answers to why collective action is rare even though social injustice is so common in the world (Becker and Tausch 2017).

According to SIT, group identification of disadvantaged group members is higher due to the unfair position of their group, which motivates them to participate in collective actions to improve the status of their group (Tajfel 1978; Mummendey et al. 1999). Studies in the literature reveal the relationship between the subjective perception of oneself as a member of a group and participation in collective actions (Mummendey et al. 1999; Drury and Reicher 2000). A meta-analysis study conducted by Van Zomeren, Postmes, and

Spears (2008) also revealed that there is a relationship between identification with the group and participation in collective actions ($r = .38$). In particular, it was also revealed that having a politicized identity predicted participation in collective actions more strongly than not having a politicized identity (Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). Researchers from a different study proposed that identification with politicized identity is the best predictor of taking part in collective actions (Simon and Klandermans 2001). and that those with politicized identity consider taking part in collective actions as an internal obligation (Stürmer and Simon 2004).

According to the assumptions of SIMCA (Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008), social identity is considered an indispensable component of participation in collective action, as can be also seen from Wright and colleagues' (1990) collective action definition. However, when collective action participation is considered an identity management strategy to cope with negative social identity in itself, it is difficult to explain why advantaged group members participate in collective actions on behalf of disadvantaged groups.

Moreover, the EMSICA (Thomas, Mavor, and McGarty 2012) is another model put forward to understand motivations for participation in collective action. This model emphasizes the importance of social identities that develop within the framework of common ideas in the emergence of collective actions. As SIMCA does, this model also proposes that social identification with particular social groups triggers the formation of collective actions. The main distinction from SIMCA is that it implies that this social identification emerges as a result of procedures that are based on shared identities formed within the framework of common opinions and norms.

Agostini and Van Zomeren (2021) have revealed the Dual Chamber Model by centering moral motivations as well as social identity, which is currently at the center of participation in collective actions. It was claimed that the relevant social identity, which is said to be necessary to engage in collective action, does not need to be the identity of a disadvantaged group in which the person identifies oneself. By integrating moral motivations into the model, the tendency of advantaged group members to identify with disadvantaged group members began to be better explained. The researchers claimed that

opinion-based group identity (a group identity that forms when individuals relate themselves to a group based on a common perspective or set of beliefs; McGarty et al. 2009) is as important as the politicized identity for participation in collective action. As EMSICA (Thomas, Mavor, and McGarty 2012) suggested, Agostini and Van Zomeren (2021) also revealed that with this relevant social identity, advantaged group members can also unite around a certain idea and participate in SBCA. Moral motivations also lead advantaged group members to identify with opinion-based groups to fight for the disadvantaged. To conclude, along with the Dual Chamber Model of collective action, the researchers extended the identity motivation to the other groups' engagement in collective action participation on behalf of disadvantaged group members.

2.1.b.ii. Morality

In the last decade, with the development of moral psychology, the importance of moral motivations for participation in collective action has been better understood (Ellemers et al. 2019). Moral motivations encompass individuals' commitment to uphold and promote their core values and significantly influence their behaviors in various ways. Witnessing the violation of strong moral or ethical principles can evoke anger in individuals and make them more willing to protest against such transgressions (Van Zomeren 2016).

Moral convictions, which represent high principles with strict rules and intolerance towards any deviation on moral issues, are one of the most powerful moral motivations (Tetlock 2002). Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2012) have included moral convictions as the fourth fundamental motivation in SIMCA to explain their relationship with participation in collective actions. According to this new model, when moral convictions are violated, individuals experience an increase in feelings of anger, group identification (particularly politicized identification), and group efficacy beliefs, thus enhancing their motivation to engage in collective actions. Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous sections, Agostini and Van Zomeren (2021) placed moral motivations at the heart of collective action with the Dual Chamber Model they built. They concluded that

moral motivations are as crucial as social identities in predicting engagement in collective actions.

There are studies in the literature on collective action that demonstrate how moral convictions motivate privileged group members to participate in collective actions against social inequality. Van Zomeren and colleagues (2011) have investigated whether moral convictions, which have been found to motivate disadvantaged groups to participate in collective action against the violation of ethical principles, would also motivate privileged group members to engage in collective action. It was demonstrated that in cases where social equality is violated, privileged group members identify more strongly with individuals who suffer from the existing inequality, thus their moral convictions that contradict social inequality motivate them to engage in collective action and strive to eliminate the existing inequality. Agostini and Van Zomeren (2021) also replicated the finding that members of advantaged groups were also motivated by moral convictions for participating in SBCAs.

Predictably, though, not every moral conviction increases the intention to take part in collective action against social inequality. For example, Agostini and Van Zomeren (2021) considered the system-justifying beliefs as moral motivations. Ideologies of system justification often argue that the current system is fair and legitimate, serves the interests of society and that economic or political inequality is somehow inevitable or acceptable. By endorsing hierarchies, and the status quo, these ideologies help to keep the existing system in place (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004). It has demonstrated that this set of beliefs poses a psychological barrier to people's participation in progressive and transformative collective actions (Jost et al. 2017). On the other hand, the motivation to participate in collective actions to protect the existing system and prevent a possible transformation can be reinforced by the beliefs of legitimating the system (Osborne et al. 2019).

2.1.b.iii. Efficacy

Another fundamental determinant of participating in collective actions is the group efficacy beliefs. According to the self-efficacy theory, efficacy belief refers to the perception that an individual can achieve a specific goal by engaging in a certain behavior

(Bandura 1997). The concept of group efficacy is used in the literature on collective action as collective efficacy, which refers to the belief that individuals can achieve collective goals through their joint efforts (Mummendey et al. 1999; Van Zomeren et al. 2004; Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). Many studies have demonstrated that collective efficacy is a fundamental factor in determining participation in collective actions (e.g., Cohen-Chen et al. 2014; Tausch and Becker 2013).

However, some individuals, known as free-riders, may hold the belief that the group will succeed in its struggle regardless, and their participation will have no impact. Therefore, they expect others to fight for their rights without making any effort themselves (Van Zomeren 2013). To explain this phenomenon, Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2012) introduced the concept of participative efficacy. Participative efficacy refers to the belief that individuals' participation in collective action will have an impact on achieving collective goals. The research conducted by Van Zomeren and colleagues (2012) has shown that participative efficacy belief determines participation in collective actions independently of individual and group efficacy beliefs.

Furthermore, according to the Dual Chamber Model constructed by Agostini and Van Zomeren (2021), efficacy beliefs were found to be significant predictors for the other group members' participation in collective actions based on solidarity with disadvantaged group members.

2.1.b.iv. Perceived Injustice and Anger

Although anger is typically perceived as a destructive emotion, especially during sudden outbursts, it can be seen as a constructive emotion in the long run as it can direct individuals towards correcting injustices and addressing wrongdoings in social life (Fischer and Roseman 2007; Becker and Tausch 2017). Another fundamental factor that motivates individuals to engage in collective actions, alongside group identification and efficacy beliefs, is group-based anger. According to the Relative Deprivation Theory, people feel anger if they perceive injustices, inequalities, or mistreatment targeting their relevant social group when comparing it with other groups. This anger, specific to the group, has the potential to motivate collective action and mobilize individuals to address

perceived grievances and advocate for social change. It originates from the sense of injustice and a longing for fairness within the group context. In a meta-analysis study, it was found that group-level anger better predicted participation in collective actions compared to individual perceptions of injustice (Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears 2008). In Agostini and Van Zomeren's study (2021), perceived injustice and anger motivations also extended to participation in SBGA alongside disadvantaged group members.

2.1.b.v. Intergroup Contact

The factors influencing participation in collective action are not limited to motivations and constraints which are stated in SIMCA (I.e., group identification, group efficacy, group-based anger, and moral motivations) and the Dual Chamber Model. Intergroup contact can also influence individuals' intentions to participate in collective actions aimed at social justice. To understand the impact of intergroup contact on intentions to participate in collective action, it is important to recognize the nature of contact and the status of the social group in the societal hierarchy.

The contact hypothesis was initially introduced by Allport (1954). According to this hypothesis, under specific conditions, intergroup contact can diminish prejudice towards outgroups. Four fundamental conditions have been proposed for effective intergroup contact: equal status, shared goals, cooperation, and support from authorities, institutions, and norms. To comprehend the impact of intergroup contact on intergroup relations, it is crucial to consider both the quality and quantity of the contact (Özkeçeci 2017). The quality of the contact is associated with the extent to which the four conditions outlined in the contact hypothesis are met, while the quantity of contact pertains to the frequency of interactions between the groups (Islam and Hewstone 1993).

Although intergroup contact has the potential to decrease prejudice, positive interactions between disadvantaged group members and advantaged group members can lead to a weakened sense of group identification, a decrease in the perceived level of discrimination, and an increased acceptance of the existing unfair system. Consequently, disadvantaged group members may be less motivated to advocate for social justice.

(Saguy et al. 2009; Dixon et al. 2012). In line with the findings mentioned above, Çakal and colleagues (2011) also found in their study that intergroup contact with advantaged groups has a sedative effect on disadvantaged groups' motivation to participate in collective actions. Disadvantaged group members may develop affective loyalties to those in the privileged group when they develop close relationships with them. Another obstacle to taking part in collective action is created by this particular situation (Becker and Tausch 2017, 70).

Some studies find different effects of intergroup contact on collective actions compared to the studies mentioned above. These studies show that, in some situations, intergroup contact encourages disadvantaged group members to participate in collective actions. For example, according to the study conducted by Reimer and colleagues (2017), if the type of intergroup contact is negative; it tends to increase the motivation of disadvantaged group members to participate in collective actions. Other studies have suggested that in situations where intergroup injustices are salient, contact with advantaged groups may increase the motivation to participate in collective actions (Becker et al. 2013). Therefore, the differences revealed in research on the impact of intergroup contact on participation in collective actions can be related to a variety of factors, including contact conditions and group dynamics.

In their study, Reimer and colleagues (2017) investigated how intergroup interaction differently affects the participation of disadvantaged and advantaged groups in collective actions. In contrast to its influence on disadvantaged group members, positive intergroup contact could motivate privileged group members to get involved in collective action. Members of privileged groups can have a better understanding of the difficulties of disadvantaged groups through direct interaction with members of these groups. This can raise their levels of awareness, build empathy, and motivate them to take action in the name of social justice. Furthermore, the interaction between different groups enables privileged group members to become aware of their privileged status. This can also develop an increased sense of responsibility in them and drive them to take part in collective actions aimed at addressing injustices. Selvanathan and colleagues (2018) examined how contact with black Americans shaped white Americans' support for the

Black Lives Matter movement and their willingness to engage in collective action against racism. It was found that positive interactions with black Americans predicted greater motivation for collective action, through having an increased sense of anger related to injustice, and also empathy for black Americans. On the other hand, in contrast to disadvantaged groups, when advantaged groups interact negatively with disadvantaged groups, their intentions to promote the well-being of disadvantaged groups through collective action are reduced (Reimer et al. 2017).

2.1.b.vi. Political Orientation and Religiosity

Although not mentioned in the previously mentioned models, people's intentions to engage in social movements are significantly influenced by their political ideologies. Research shows that as individuals' political views move towards the left on the political ideology spectrum, their intentions to participate in and support progressive and system-challenging social movements increase. However, as the spectrum shifts towards the right, individuals' attitudes toward progressive social movements become more negative, and their support decreases (Becker 2020). Individuals with conservative ideology tend to act in ways that preserve and sustain the existing system because they seek to minimize situations that could lead to uncertainty and potential chaos (Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008). The study conducted by Akkuş and colleagues (2020) regarding the Gezi Park movement in Türkiye showed that people with conservative ideologies tend to hold negative attitudes towards the Gezi Park protests and believed that the movement should be suppressed with violence if needed.

Religiosity also influences individuals' approaches to and intentions for collective actions. In a study examining collective action participation in the context of the Gezi Park protests, it was found that individuals with higher levels of religiosity tended to be against the Gezi Park protests, while those with lower levels of religiosity showed a tendency to support the protests (Demirdağ and Hasta 2019; as cited in Uluğ, Solak, and Acar 2022).

2.1.b.vii. Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation

It has been found that ideological dispositions such as RWA and SDO may predict the attitude of individuals toward refugee groups to be more hostile (Cowling, Anderson,

and Ferguson 2019). The RWA is a type of personality defined by a demand for compliance with social norms, obedience to law and authority, support for social oppression, and other relevant characteristics arising from a high-threat perception (Stenner 2009). Individuals with higher levels of RWA tended to avoid interactions with the outgroups and have higher threat perceptions (Jost et al. 2017). Çakal and colleagues (2016) highlighted that members of privileged groups with higher RWA would not be willing to advocate for social change and might even be motivated to take action against those at a disadvantage.

Another ideological disposition identified as SDO is perceiving the world as a place of constant competition and is associated with the idea of "dog-eat-dog" and a "zero-sum game". Thus, individuals with higher levels of SDO are motivated to legitimize societal injustices and inequalities, maintain the existing social order, and believe in a competitive societal order (Levin 2002), resulting in a lack of empathy for members of underprivileged groups (Bäckström and Björklund 2007). SDO is another factor that has been found to inhibit participation in collective action based on solidarity with the disadvantaged (Stewart et al. 2016).

2.1.b.viii. Privilege Awareness

Privilege awareness is the recognition of one's advantaged position and unearned privileges in society as a direct consequence of one's membership in a particular social group, such as one's gender, sexual orientation, or nationality (McIntosh 1988; Uysal et al. 2022). Privilege awareness is another factor that positively influences attitudes towards outgroups (Stewart 2012) and intentions for solidarity (Uluğ and Tropp 2021), and it has not been previously addressed in the models mentioned in this study related to collective action. By recognizing and understanding their privilege, individuals may develop a sense of guilt and consequently show greater concern for the struggles faced by disadvantaged outgroups (Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003). This heightened awareness of privilege can lead to increased support and engagement in collective action efforts aimed at promoting social justice and equality (Uluğ and Tropp 2021; Uysal et al. 2022). According to a recent study by Uysal and colleagues (2022), individuals who have a high awareness of their privilege regarding their sexual orientation are more inclined to show

solidarity with LGBTQ+ individuals and have higher intentions to engage in collective action on behalf of them.

In the previous sections, the factors found in the literature to influence the participation of both privileged group members and disadvantaged group members in collective actions were discussed. These factors were often those that motivated and facilitated participation in collective action. Since the subject of the current study is the intentions of the local community in Türkiye to engage in SBCA on behalf of Syrian refugees, the focus will be specifically given to privileged group members' collective action intentions. Furthermore, as Gorska and colleagues (2020) also mentioned, while the relevant literature has extensively studied what accelerates collective action participation among advantaged groups, less attention has been given to what hinders solidarity-based actions.

It was mentioned that opinion-based group memberships and shared identities, moral convictions, efficacy beliefs, feelings of anger, positive intergroup contact with the disadvantaged, and privilege awareness of the advantaged group members are factors that were found in previous studies to increase the intentions of individuals belonging to privileged groups to engage in collective action based on solidarity with disadvantaged groups. Whereas, negative intergroup contact with the disadvantaged, system justification beliefs, being politically conservative, religiousness, RWA, and SDO were discussed as factors that inhibit engagement in SBCAs.

Another factor that is negatively associated with SBCA intentions is CN. Since the subject of this thesis is the relationship between CN and SBCA intentions of the local community on behalf of Syrians, this concept will be explained in a separate section.

2.2. Collective Narcissism

The concept of CN, being a form of group identification, is also examined within the framework of SIT. In their work on SIT, Tajfel and Turner (1986) demonstrated that individuals develop and shape their own social identities by defining themselves within social groups. Individuals typically depend on their social identities as a means to increase their self-esteem. Moreover, they need to feel pleased about the groups they are a part of

to enhance their self-esteem through their social identities. By attaching positive attributes to their ingroup, they form favorable feelings and thoughts about their own identity and, as a result, enhance their self-esteem (Abrams and Hogg 1988).

Group members often engage in continuous social comparisons between their group and other groups. Through these social comparisons, they strive to perceive their group more positively than other groups (Brewer 1979). This inclination of individuals to positively differentiate their group leads to significant differences in their attitudes towards the in-group and the out-group. Some of these outcomes include in-group bias, favoritism towards in-group members, the tendency to perceive in-group members and out-group members on unequal footing, and in-group positivity (Brewer 1999).

Identification with the in-group, as a process, can take many different forms. As individuals can differ in their level of in-group identification, their type of identification can also differ. Members of social groups might be either defensively or securely committed to their group. Securely attaching to a social group is referred to as non-narcissistic in-group positivity, whereas insecurely or defensively attaching to the group is defined as narcissistic in-group positivity. Defensive commitment to the in-group is also described as CN (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009).

Narcissism at the collective level and narcissism at the individual level have very similar features. The defensive characteristic is apparent at both the individual and group levels of narcissism, except that one reflects the other at the group level (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009). Individual narcissism is characterized by an egotistical self-concept, and a demand for outside validation of self-worth, and it has its roots in unfulfilled desires such as control and competence (Crocker and Park 2004). These people are hypersensitive to potential threats from the outside, their self-evaluations are highly dependent on other people's opinions and they seek constant external affirmation (Morf and Rhodewalt 2001) because they have damaged and fragile self-views (Kohut 1972; Crocker and Park 2004). Moreover, the empathic and perspective-taking abilities of narcissistic individuals are generally weak. Narcissistic individuals may have limited skills in understanding others' emotions and seeing things from others' perspectives (Morf and Rhodewalt 2001).

Similar to this, in group-level narcissism, the worth of the group is dependent on outside appraisals. CN is known for holding the idea that the ingroup is extraordinary and worthy of special treatment but is not fully acknowledged by others (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009; Golec de Zavala 2011; Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar and Lantos 2019). Individuals high on CN tend to establish group superiority, haughtiness, and contempt towards other groups. This defensiveness in CN is rooted in unfulfilled individual needs, which is similar to individual-level narcissism. This inflated ingroup image, which is tried to be created, is compensation for unfulfilled individual needs. Individuals with high CN are more concerned with how the group appears (i.e., the group's image) rather than the actual state of the group. Therefore, they are preoccupied with the benefits that the group's image can bring to themselves, rather than benefiting the group itself (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009). Narcissistic attachment to the group can have adverse outcomes for both the in-group and out-group. People who are defensively attached to their group are extremely sensitive to any threat to their group's image (Golec de Zavala et al. 2016), leading to an intensified perception of threat (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009; Golec de Zavala and Cichocka 2012). As a result, they are distrustful of other groups and their members, tend to believe in conspiracies about threats from outside groups, are filled with suspicions (Cichocka, Marchlewska, and Golec De Zavala 2016; Golec de Zavala and Federico 2018), and tend to display hostile attitudes towards outgroups (Golec de Zavala, Cichoska, and Iskra-Golec 2013; Golec de Zavala et al. 2020). Additionally, in the face of any failure or setback within their group, they tend to blame the out-groups as a scapegoat (Golec de Zavala 2011).

Group identification does not occur in a single way and does not always result in negative outcomes. Individuals can form healthier and non-defensive identification with a social group. This form of commitment, which is significantly different from narcissistic in-group positivity, does not involve narcissistic components and is referred to as secure in-group positivity (Brewer 1999). Similar to how CN resembles narcissism at the individual level, secure in-group positivity also shares similar characteristics with secure self-esteem. People with secure self-esteem tend to perceive themselves as valuable and acceptable individuals. These individuals accept their values and abilities through internal evaluation, without depending on external approval, and acceptance. Also, they are open

to admitting their weaknesses. Individuals construct their secure self-esteem through a healthy childhood experience in which their personal needs, such as love, acceptance, and positive feedback, are met in a healthy manner (Kernis 2003).

Similar to secure self-esteem, individuals who form a secure commitment to their social groups are concerned with benefiting their groups rather than solely focusing on the benefits they can derive from the group's image. Therefore, they do not have an exaggerated sensitivity to the image of the in-group, and their perception of the threat to the in-group image is low. Unlike defensive in-group positivity, they do not hold excessive distrust and suspicion towards out-groups, also they are more tolerable of external threats (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Bilewicz 2013). Individuals with secure in-group identification have more positive attitudes toward out-groups compared to collective narcissists, and they do not display hostile attitudes. In other words, having a secure attachment to the group leads to more positive outcomes for out-groups, as well as being beneficial for one's own group's well-being (Brewer 1999).

In a study conducted by Dyduch-Hazar and colleagues (2019) with a sample from Poland, they showed that Poles with high levels of CN displayed hostile attitudes toward Syrian refugees. However, in contrast, individuals with in-group satisfaction (i.e., a positive assessment of the group that is tolerant of external threats, not dependent on external approval and recognition; Leach et al. 2008) did not exhibit these hostile attitudes towards Syrian refugees. In addition, it was determined that the hostile attitude attributed to Syrian refugees by Poles with high levels of CN explains this relationship. In other words, people with high CN tend to perceive that the Syrian refugees had hostile intentions toward the Poles. On the other hand, in-group satisfaction was found to be associated with tolerance toward Syrian refugees.

In their study in which the relationship between CN and privileged group members' intentions of engaging in collective action to show solidarity with the disadvantaged was investigated, Gorska and colleagues (2020) found that CN has led to an inhibitory effect on SBCA intentions of the privileged group members. Furthermore, this study was conducted not only based on national-level CN but also on gender-based and sexual orientation-based CN. The research has also demonstrated that the negative

correlation between privileged group members' CN and SBCA intentions on behalf of disadvantaged group members was explained by a decline in group-based empathy. Moreover, CN is linked to decreased group-based empathy and SBCA via enhanced intergroup anxiety. It is important to note that the researchers claimed that intergroup anxiety was used as a representation of intergroup threat in this study (Gorska et al. 2020).

In their work, Golec de Zavala, Cichoska, and Iskra-Golec (2013) aimed to understand the process underlying the relationship between CN and intergroup hostility and the effect of in-group image threat on this relationship. Their results showed that under the in-group criticism condition, CN predicts hostile attitudes towards the offending outgroup. However, under the in-group praise condition, the relationship between CN and hostile attitudes was not significant. The researchers have demonstrated that individuals with high levels of CN perceive in-group criticism as a personal threat and attempt to reconstruct a positive self and group image. They reveal that the perception of being personally threatened in the face of ingroup criticism mediates the relationship between CN and hostile attitudes towards outgroups. Additionally, increased levels of RWA and SDO were found to be identified as predictors of hostile attitudes directed to the out-group that offended the in-group. RWA and SDO were also found to be positively correlated with CN (Cichočka, Dhont, and Makwana 2017).

In conclusion, CN is correlated with unfavorable attitudes and hatred for those from other groups. It is marked by an exaggerated conviction about the significance of one's group, a constant state of alertness, and ongoing concern about maintaining and preserving the exalted in-group image. Conversely, those who are securely attached to their in-groups and satisfied with where they belong, are not hypersensitive to threats from outside and are not inclined to act with hostility toward members of other groups. Additionally, research has demonstrated that CN hinders members of advantaged groups from attempting to take part in collective action in solidarity with those who are disadvantaged. This is attributed to a reduction in empathy levels and an increase in intergroup anxiety. Moreover, CN is strongly associated with in-group image defense, and people with a high CN display hostile attitudes towards the outgroup in the face of perceived threats to the group's image.

2.3. The Current Study

This section discusses the current study, its subject, scope, aim, research questions, hypothesis, and why this topic is worth researching.

2.3.a. The Subject and the Scope of the Thesis

The subject of this thesis is the SBCA intentions of the local community on behalf of Syrian refugees in Türkiye. SBCA is defined as “collective action undertaken by individuals belonging to privileged groups in support of a disadvantaged group” (Becker and Tausch 2017).

The scope of the study was limited to the engagement in the SBCA of the local community in Türkiye on behalf of only Syrian refugees. The solidarity-based attitudes towards refugees from other countries will not be studied. The foremost reason for this is that the Syrians constitute the refugee group with the highest number in Türkiye. Moreover, the Syrian refugee crisis is a major event that affected Türkiye, other neighboring countries to Syria, and Europe on its own (UNHCR 2023). Another factor contributing to the exclusive focus on Syrian refugees is the high politicization of the issue in Türkiye (Erdoğan 2021, 319), where the local community views Syrian refugees as a threat to both the economy and culture and attributes hostile attitudes towards them. As a result, the issue of Syrian refugees began to be seen as a security issue and the “problem of survival” (*bekâ sorunu*) for Türkiye over time (e.g., Zileli 2019; Yılmaz 2023; Yılkm 2023). For this reason, it has been deemed appropriate to study the issue of Syrian refugees separately from the relations of the local community with other refugee groups.

2.3.b. The Purpose of the Thesis and the Problem

This thesis aims to investigate the relationship between CN and the local community’s solidarity-based attitudes toward Syrian refugees in Türkiye, specifically focusing on the role of in-group image threat. Therefore, it aims to examine the effect of CN on SBCA intentions, as well as examine the moderating role of in-group image threat in the relationship between CN and SBCA intentions. Accordingly, the research questions of the study are as follows:

RQ1. “Does CN affect the local community’s intentions to engage in collective action based on solidarity with the Syrian refugees in Türkiye?”

RQ2. Does manipulating the ingroup image threat affect the local community’s intentions to engage in collective action based on solidarity with the Syrian refugees in Türkiye?”

RQ3. “Does the in-group image threat moderate the relationship between CN and the local community’s intentions of engagement in collective action on behalf of Syrian refugees?”

The Hypotheses of the study are as follows:

H1. There will be a statistically significant relationship between CN and SBCA intentions of the local community on behalf of Syrian refugees. It is predicted that high scores on CN will predict decreased SBCA intentions. However, low scores on CN will predict increased SBCA intentions. Therefore, it is predicted that there will be a statistically significant negative correlation between CN and the SBCA intentions of the local community.

H2. Manipulating the ingroup image threat will affect the local community’s intentions to engage in SBCA on behalf of Syrian refugees. In the in-group image criticism condition, participants' intention to engage in SBCA will be statistically significantly lower compared to the in-group praise condition.

H3. The relationship between CN and SBCA intentions will be moderated by in-group image threat. It is expected that manipulating the in-group image threat will affect the relationship between CN (I.e., the independent variable) and SBCA intentions (I.e., the dependent variable). The relationship between CN and SBCA intentions will be stronger in the in-group image criticism condition compared to the in-group praise condition. However, in the in-group praise condition, the relationship between CN and SBCA intentions will be weaker compared to the in-group criticism condition. That is, the negative correlation between CN and SBCA intentions will weaken under the condition that the ingroup is praised.

2.3.c. The Significance of the Subject and Contribution of the Current Research

Even though the literature regarding collective action mostly focuses on the disadvantaged groups' actions, to challenge the status quo and social inequality, it is important for advantaged groups to act in solidarity with disadvantaged groups. When the relevant literature focuses not only on the participation of disadvantaged groups but also on the involvement of advantaged groups in collective actions, researchers and practitioners can gain a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities related to collective action for progressive social change. This broader perspective enables a deeper understanding of the dynamics and implications of collective action, allowing for the development and implementation of more effective strategies.

Uluğ, Solak, and Acar (2022) highlight the scarcity of studies that focus on advantaged group members' collective action intentions in the Türkiye context. Therefore, studying the advantaged groups' SBCA intentions from the perspective of the local community and the refugee groups in Türkiye is a subject that is worthy of investigation.

Another potential contribution of the current research is that the majority of research on collective action participation aiming for progressive social change has predominantly relied on data from samples in contexts that were classified as WEIRD (WEIRD stands for Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic). Hence, it is essential to investigate the replicability of factors that are found to influence collective action intentions in non-WEIRD contexts and the generalizability of findings of the studies conducted in WEIRD contexts to non-WEIRD contexts such as Türkiye (Doğruyol, Alper, and Yilmaz 2019; Uluğ, Solak, and Acar 2022).

Furthermore, the majority of collective action studies tend to concentrate on factors that enhance the willingness to engage in collective action. Conversely, there has been limited consideration given to the factors that impede involvement in solidarity-oriented collective actions (Gorska et al. 2020). It is important to understand the barriers to collective action and progressive social change because doing so helps in developing effective strategies for making progress in society on important issues such as justice,

equality, and human rights (Acar and Uluğ 2016). Understanding such barriers enables identifying the factors that complicate social change and produce more effective solutions. More importantly, the obstacles to collective action and progressive social change can be better comprehended if the potential risks and expenses of involvement in collective action are considered in non-WEIRD and authoritarian contexts like Türkiye (Uluğ, Solak, and Acar 2022).

Furthermore, the concept of CN is important in understanding intergroup relations and it is well-known that it leads to negative intergroup relations (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009). Since CN is a variable that is also found to suppress SBCA intentions, it is valuable to study this concept in the context of solidarity with refugees. There are not enough studies in the literature examining this relationship in the context of refugees (for an exception see, Gorska et al. 2020). On the other hand, understanding the dynamics of CN and its association with attitudes towards refugee groups is crucial for promoting social cohesion and addressing intergroup conflicts between the local community and the refugee groups. By examining the influence of CN on privileged group members' intentions to engage in SBCA with disadvantaged groups, the study sheds light on the mechanisms underlying intergroup dynamics and the potential barriers to collective action for social change.

Most of the studies in the literature regarding intergroup relations and refugees focus on the attitudes of the local community towards refugees such as prejudice and discrimination. However, there is a limited number of studies on the intentions of the local community -which is a more advantaged social group in the social hierarchy- to engage in a collective action based on solidarity with disadvantaged refugees. Therefore, one potential contribution of this study is focusing on another aspect of the relationship between the local community and the refugee groups.

At the same time, in this thesis, the in-group image threat was manipulated via two message contents regarding in-group criticism and in-group praise. The fact that an experimental manipulation was carried out in the study distinguishes this study from similar studies in the literature. Using experimental manipulation allows potential confounding variables to be eliminated. Gorska and colleagues (2020) pointed out in their

studies that there is a gap in the literature regarding the potential variables that could affect the association between CN and SBCA intentions on behalf of disadvantaged group members. The researchers also claimed that perceived threat might be experimentally manipulated to clarify this relationship between CN and SBCA intentions of the privileged group members. By manipulating the in-group image threat, this thesis aims to shed light on the mechanisms underlying the aforementioned relationship.



CHAPTER III

METHOD

3.1. Participants

Using snowball and convenience sampling methods, a total of 702 participants were reached. 72% of the participants ($n=508$) consisted of individuals who voluntarily participated in the study without any bonus points, while 28% ($n=194$) were individuals who participated in the survey in exchange for bonus points offered for their university courses. At the beginning of the survey, there was an informed consent form (see Appendix A) and two criteria questions (see Appendix B) to proceed with the survey. One of these criteria was being a Turkish citizen, and the other was being a university student. As 7 individuals did not provide consent, 3 individuals were not Turkish citizens, and 66 individuals were not university students, a total of 76 individuals left the study without starting the survey, and these participants were excluded from the dataset. Moreover, a total of 246 individuals were excluded from the dataset as they left the survey without completing it. Additionally, 21 participants failed the attention check questions embedded within the long scales (e.g. "If you are reading this statement, select option 3") and 3 participants did not confirm the statement "I confirm that I have not previously been informed about the content and measurement tools of this study." At the end of the survey were also excluded from the dataset.

After this course of data cleaning, a total of 356 participants were left in the dataset. Out of 356 survey respondents, 89.6% ($n=319$) identified themselves as Turkish. Moreover, 14 participants identified themselves as Kurdish, while 4 participants identified themselves as Arab. Those who chose the "Other" option constituted 5.3% of the survey participants with 19 individuals. Since the independent variable of the study was Turkishness-based national collective narcissism, data analysis was planned to be carried out only with the data of the participants who defined themselves as Turkish.

When excluding participants from the dataset who did not identify themselves as Turkish, there remained 319 participants to be included in the analysis. Female

participants constituted 65.8% of the survey sample with 210 participants. %32.9 of the participants were male with 105 individuals. Three participants defined their gender as “other” and one participant chose the “I do not want to specify” answer regarding gender. The mean age of the participants was 22.4 (SD=3.5) and the age of participants ranged from 18 to 44. The whole sample of the study consisted of Turkish citizens and university students from diverse disciplines of different universities. Out of 319 participants, 268 (84%) were undergraduate students, 33 were pursuing a master's degree (10.3%), 10 were doctoral students (3.1%), 7 were associate degree students (2.2%), and 1 participant was enrolled in an open education program (0.3%).

Participants were also asked how much their religious beliefs affected their daily lives with options ranging from 0 (*not at all*) to 10 (*quite a lot*). The mean of the participants' answers regarding religiosity was 4.15, ranging from 0 to 10. In the survey, participants were also asked where they positioned themselves politically on an 11-Likert-type scale. The 5 at the far left indicates the *extreme-left political orientation*, while the 5 at the far right indicates the *extreme-right political orientation*. The 0 in the middle of the scale stands for the *center* as political orientation. The average of the participants' political orientation scores was 4.43, ranging from the 5 for far right and the 5 for far left. Participants were also asked to indicate their socioeconomic status (SES) using a 10-step ladder as a subjective measurement tool (1 represents the *lowest* 10 represents the *highest* SES). The mean subjective SES score of the participants was 6.22.

When looking at the distribution of participants' cities of residence, participants living in Ankara comprised the majority (58%) with 184 respondents. The second most common city of residence was İzmir, with 80 participants (25%). Participants residing in Istanbul accounted for 15 individuals, making up 5% of the survey participants. The remaining 46 participants participated in the survey from 19 different cities, and this number accounts for 12% of the survey participants. Participants from the cities of Antalya, Kayseri, Manisa, Adana, Eskişehir, Aydın, Konya, Mersin, Muğla, Samsun, Düsseldorf, Kastamonu, Kırklareli, Kütahya, Mardin, Tekirdağ, Tokat, Trabzon, and Uşak took part in the survey, with the number of participants from each city ranging from 1 to 5.

3.2. Materials

3.2.a. In-group Image Threat

To manipulate in-group image threat, two different message contents were created for *in-group criticism* and *in-group praise* conditions. In the two different message contents, the Turkish identity was either criticized or praised by the Syrians (see Appendix C). The message content for the in-group praise condition is taken from the news of the Sabah Newspaper and the Ensonhaber website, dated July 2021 (Ensonhaber 2021; Sabah 2021). This news, which was used for the in-group praise condition, was about two Syrian children who were working as paper collectors, taking the Turkish flag out of the garbage and hanging it on the iron railings (see Figure 3.1) While creating this message content, the news on these two websites was combined, and some parts of the news were modified by the researcher to keep the events and people mentioned in the news anonymous. On the other hand, for the in-group criticism condition, message content was created by manipulating the original news content. In this condition, there was a message content regarding Syrians lowering the Turkish flag they found hanging (see Figure 3.2).

The photos used in the message contents were also taken from the same news websites. As presented in Figure 3.2, for the in-group criticism condition, the photos in the original news were given in reverse order for manipulation purposes. Canva website was used to make the message content in the survey look like news articles. Moreover, the two message contents were of similar length. So, it took participants a similar time to read the text.

Figure 3.1. Images in In-group Praise Condition



Figure 3.2. Images in In-group Criticism Condition (Reverse Order)



3.2.b. Manipulation Check Question

To test whether the manipulation was effective or not, a manipulation check question was directed to the participants (see Appendix D). The manipulation check question was “How does the behavior described in the news affect your perception of the Turkish image?”. Participants were asked to provide two separate ratings on a 5-point scale. The first rating measured glorification, and the second rating assessed derogatory attitudes with options ranging from 1 (indicates *strong derogatory attitudes*) to 5 (indicates *strong glorifying attitudes*). To rule out the explanation that the manipulation check question affects the participant's responses to the dependent variable which is

SBCA intentions, one part of the study was conducted with manipulation control and the other part without manipulation control (Hauser, Ellsworth, and Gonzalez 2018).

3.2.c. Solidarity-based Collective Action Intentions

3.2.c.i. Imaginary Scenario: A Discriminatory Decision Towards Syrians

Before measuring the SBCA intentions, participants were given an imaginary scenario (see Appendix E). This scenario was about a discriminatory decision taken by the university's rectorate towards Syrian students at the participants' universities. Participants were asked to read this scenario carefully, imagine the situation in which this scenario took place, and mark the answers that most suited them to the related questions.

After reading this scenario, the SBCA intentions of the participants were measured with the SBCA Intentions Scale (see Appendix E) (Górska et al. 2020; Cronbach's Alpha=.84). There are 5 items in this scale and it is a 7-point Likert-type scale. Participants will report their willingness to participate in the indicated actions [participating in a demonstration, donating money to a campaign to oppose this decision, distributing information on the subject (from social media, WhatsApp groups, etc.), and signing a petition] to object to the discriminatory decision which is taken against Syrian refugee students in the university. 1 indicates *very unlikely* and 7 indicates *very likely*. The internal reliability of the scale was found to be satisfactory ($\alpha = .89$). This scale was adapted to Turkish by the researcher of this study. In addition, an extra item “*boycotting the school cafeteria*” was added to the scale by the researcher.

3.2.d. Collective Narcissism Scale

Participants' Turkish national CN scores were measured with the Collective Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al. 2009; Cronbach's Alpha=.82) referring to the national ingroup as "Turks". In this study, the Turkish version of the Collective Narcissism Scale which was developed by Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2016) was used (see Appendix F). The scale has a 9-item and 7-point Likert-type scale. One sample item is “If Turks had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place”. Participants

were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with each statement on the scale. 1 indicates strong disagreement, while 7 indicates strong agreement. The higher the score on the scale, the higher the CN, and the lower the score on the scale, the lower the CN. The Cronbach's Alpha reliability of the scale was found to be satisfactory ($\alpha = .90$)

3.2.e. Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale

To measure RWA, the RWA Scale was used (see Appendix G). This scale was initially developed by Altemeyer (1996) and adapted into Turkish by Güldü (2011). The scale has satisfactory internal reliability ($\alpha = .93$) The scale consists of 22 items and is a 7-point Likert-type scale. One sample item is "What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take us back to our true path". Participants were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with each statement on the scale. 1 implies *strongly disagree*, while 7 implies *strongly agree*. High scores on this scale indicate more authoritarian attitudes while low scores indicate fewer authoritarian attitudes. The internal reliability of the scale was found to be satisfactory ($\alpha = .87$).

3.2.f. Social Dominance Orientation Scale

SDO was measured with the SDO Scale (see Appendix H). This scale was developed by Pratto and colleagues (1994) and the Turkish version of the scale was obtained from Akbas (2010; Cronbach's Alpha = .92). The scale consists of 16 items and is a 7-point Likert-type scale. One sample item is "Some groups of people are just worthier than others". Participants were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with each statement on the scale. 1 implies *strongly disagree*, while 7 implies *strongly agree*. Higher scores indicate a higher SDO. The internal reliability of the scale was found to be satisfactory ($\alpha = .92$).

3.2.g. Intergroup Threat Scale

The intergroup threat was measured using the Intergroup Threat Scale developed by Stephan and colleagues (1999) and adapted to Turkish by Özkeçeci (2017) (see Appendix I). The scale consists of two separate parts. The first of these is the Realistic

Threat Scale (Cronbach's Alpha = .88). This scale consists of 9 items. One sample item is “With the arrival of Syrians, access to health services became more difficult.”. The other part is the Symbolic Threat Scale (Cronbach's Alpha = .91). This scale also consists of 9 items. One sample item is “Syrians are not like us in terms of their lifestyles”. The Intergroup Threat Scale is a 7-point Likert-type scale and 1 implies *strongly disagree*, while 7 implies *strongly agree*. Higher scores on this scale indicate higher threat perception. For the Realistic Intergroup Threat Scale, the internal reliability of the scale was found to be satisfactory ($\alpha = .90$). For the Symbolic Intergroup Threat Scale, the internal reliability of the scale was also found to be satisfactory ($\alpha = .94$).

3.2.h. Turkish Identification Scale

Turkish identification was measured using the Turkish version of the Multi-component In-group Identification Scale developed by Leach et al. (2008) and adapted into Turkish by Balaban (2013; Cronbach's Alpha = .94) (see Appendix J). This scale consists of 20 items and is a 7-point Likert-type scale. One sample item of the scale is “I identify myself with other Turks”. Participants were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement with each statement on the scale. 1 indicates strong disagreement, while 7 indicates strong agreement. The internal reliability of the scale was found to be satisfactory ($\alpha = .96$). Higher scores in this survey indicate higher national identification.

3.2.i. Demographic Information Form

The survey included some demographic questions which were gender, age, city of residence, education level, ethnic identities, subjective socioeconomic status, and Turkish citizenship status (see Appendix K). Participants were also asked to evaluate their levels of religiosity and political orientation. They indicated how much their religious beliefs affected their daily lives. It has an 11-point Likert-type scale. 0 indicates *not at all*, while 10 indicates *quite a lot*. Participants also indicated where they positioned themselves politically from *left-wing* to *right-wing* on an 11-Likert-type scale. On the scale, the 1 at the far left denotes the extreme-left political orientation, while the 11 at the far right denotes the extreme-right political orientation. The 6 in the middle of the scale represents the *center* as political orientation. At the end of the demographic, religiosity, and political

orientation questions; participants were asked to confirm that they had not been informed about the content of this study and the measurement tools beforehand.

3.3. Procedure

The study was submitted for the approval of the Human Research Evaluation Board of TOBB University of Economics and Technology before the data collection started. After the study was approved by the board (see Appendix M), an online questionnaire was created via the Qualtrics Survey Platform. The data was collected through convenience and snowball sampling methods. An announcement text has been prepared to invite participation in the study. The link to the survey was shared via email with the students who were going to participate in the survey in exchange for bonus points in their courses. Students who participated in the study were given bonus course points in exchange for their participation. At the same time, the invitation to participate in the survey was shared on various social media accounts (Twitter, Instagram, etc.), and WhatsApp groups.

Participants accessed the survey online by clicking the survey link. The survey began with the informed consent form. For the good of the study purposes, the purpose of the study was stated in the informed consent form as "to get an idea about the feelings and thoughts of the local community in Türkiye regarding their attachment to their identity, how they see different social groups and their thoughts on current social/political issues in Türkiye". Participants were required to approve the consent form to continue the study. After the consent form was approved, the following questions were asked of the participants: "Are you a citizen of the Turkish Republic?", "Are you a university student?". Since the study's sample group was aimed to consist of university students who were citizens of the Republic of Türkiye, the participants who did not meet at least one of these criteria were thanked and excluded from the study.

Participants who pass to the next stage by meeting all the criteria were randomly assigned to two different message content conditions which are in-group criticism and in-group praise. Afterward, the participants were given manipulation check questions. However, to rule out the explanation that the dependent variable may be affected by the

manipulation check questions, half of the study was conducted with manipulation check questions, while the other half was conducted without the manipulation check questions (Hauser, Ellsworth, and Gonzalez 2018).

After answering the manipulation check questions, the participants moved on to the part where the dependent variable which is SBCA intentions would be measured. Participants who were not given a manipulation check moved directly onto the part where the dependent variable was measured. Before the SBCA Intentions Scale was filled, participants were asked to read the imaginary scenario and answer the following questions accordingly. Following the SBCA Intentions Scale, the participants were given the CN scale which is the independent variable of the study.

Then, the scales of the control variables which are the RWA Scale, the SDO Scale, the Intergroup Threat Scale, and the Turkish Identification Scale were given to participants in random order. After the materials of the control variables were completed, the demographic information form was given to the participants.

Having completed the questionnaire, the debriefing form (see Appendix L) was given to the participants. In this section, the research question and purpose of the study, as well as dependent, independent, and moderator variables were mentioned. Moreover, it was mentioned which of the news contents that the participants encountered in the study were fictional news and which were based on real news. In addition, the participants were thanked for their time and participation in the study.

In the study, the items on all the scales were randomized. Thus, all items in the scales were given to the participants in random order. To complete the survey, participants were required to answer all the items and questions throughout the study. It took approximately 20 minutes to complete the study. There was no time limit in any part of the study.

3.4. Analysis Plan

The questionnaire of this study consists of a series of scales and an experimental setup. It also includes an informed consent form, a demographic information form, and a

debriefing form. The independent variable of the study is CN. To measure participants' CN levels the Turkish version of the CN Scale was used (Golec de Zavala et al. 2016). Since the study's independent variable is Turkishness-based national collective narcissism, the data analysis was conducted only with the data of participants who identified themselves as Turkish.

In-group image threat was the moderator variable of the study. In-group image threat was manipulated via an experimental setup. The dependent variable of the study was the participant's SBCA participation intentions. The participants' attitudes towards solidarity with Syrian refugees were measured with the SBCA Intentions Scale (Górska et al. 2020). RWA, SDO, intergroup threat, and in-group identification were control variables of the current study. In this respect, the RWA Scale, SDO Scale, Intergroup Threat Scale, and Identity with Turkishness Scale were used to measure the control variables. All scales in the study were self-report questionnaires.

To assess the effectiveness of the in-group image threat manipulation, participants rated the behavior exhibited by Syrians in the news they read on two separate dimensions: glorification and derogatory attitudes, each measured on a 5-point scale. A Manipulation Check analysis using Independent Sample T-tests was conducted to compare the ratings between participants in the in-group praise and in-group criticism conditions.

To address concerns about the potential priming effects of the manipulation check questions on participants' responses to the dependent variable (SBCA intentions), the study was conducted in two parts: one with manipulation control and the other without manipulation control. A comparison between groups that received the manipulation check questions and those that did not was conducted using Independent Sample T-tests.

Correlational analyses were performed using Pearson's Correlation Test to examine the relationships between SBCA and the variables of interest, including CN, RWA, SDO, realistic intergroup threat, symbolic intergroup threat, and Turkish identification.

Independent Sample T-tests were conducted to investigate the relationship between in-group image threat manipulation and SBCA. Participants in the in-group praise condition were compared to those in the in-group criticism condition.

A moderation analysis was performed using the PROCESS bootstrapping command, following Hayes' approach, to explore the potential role of in-group image threat manipulation as a moderator in the relationship between CN and SBCA. The analysis included RWA, SDO, symbolic intergroup threat, realistic intergroup threat, and Turkish identification as covariates.

Additional mediation analyses were conducted using the PROCESS bootstrapping command, following Hayes' approach, to explore the mediating roles of SDO and realistic intergroup threat in the relationship between CN and SBCA.

All analyses were conducted using the IBM SPSS software program.



CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

4.1. Manipulation Check

To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation, participants were presented with the following question regarding the behavior exhibited by Syrians in the news they read: 'How does the behavior described in the news affect your perception of the Turkish image?' They were asked to provide two separate ratings on a 5-point scale. The first rating measured glorification, with options ranging from 1 (indicating strong derogatory attitudes) to 5 (indicating strong glorifying attitudes). The second rating assessed derogatory attitudes, with options ranging from 1 (indicating strong derogatory attitudes) to 5 (indicating strong glorifying attitudes). The results revealed that participants in the in-group praise condition rated the behavior as significantly more glorifying ($M = 3.92$, $SD = 1.12$) compared to those in the in-group criticism condition ($M = 1.24$, $SD = 0.61$, $p < .001$). Conversely, participants in the in-group criticism condition rated the behavior as significantly more derogatory ($M = 4.03$, $SD = 1.12$) compared to those in the in-group praise condition ($M = 1.70$, $SD = 1.05$, $p < .001$). These findings provide evidence that the manipulation was successful, as it effectively influenced participants' attitudes toward the described behavior concerning the Turkish image.

Furthermore, to address concerns that the manipulation check questions might influence participants' responses to the dependent variable, which is SBICA intentions, the study was conducted in two parts: one with manipulation control and the other without manipulation control. The results were compared between the groups who received the manipulation check questions and those who did not. The findings revealed no significant differences between the participants who were presented with the manipulation check questions and those who were not ($p = .467$). This indicates that the act of asking a manipulation check question did not have a priming effect or any other influence on participants' responses to the DV. Consequently, it can be confidently concluded that the

observed effects on SBCA intentions are a result of the experimental manipulation rather than any potential bias introduced by the manipulation check questions.

4.2. Correlations

As presented in Table 4.1, SBCA was negatively correlated with CN ($r = -.36$), RWA ($r = -.25$), SDO ($r = -.52$), realistic intergroup threat ($r = -.65$), symbolic intergroup threat ($r = -.57$), and Turkish identification ($r = -.23$). In addition, CN was positively correlated with RWA ($r = .46$), SDO ($r = .26$), realistic intergroup threat ($r = .55$), symbolic intergroup threat ($r = .47$), and Turkish identification ($r = .71$). RWA was positively correlated with SDO ($r = .42$), realistic intergroup threat ($r = .21$), symbolic intergroup threat ($r = .18$), and Turkish identification ($r = .54$). SDO was positively correlated with realistic intergroup threat ($r = .42$), symbolic intergroup threat ($r = .37$), and Turkish identification ($r = .26$). Realistic intergroup threat was positively correlated with symbolic intergroup threat ($r = .80$), and Turkish identification ($r = .39$). Symbolic intergroup threat was positively correlated with Turkish identification ($r = .35$).

<i>Variables</i>	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. SBCA	3.86	1.84	-						
2. CN	3.89	1.39	-.36**	-					
3. RWA	2.78	.89	-.25**	.46**	-				
4. SDO	3.00	1.25	-.52**	.26**	.42**	-			
5. IGT_R	5.20	1.29	-.65**	.55**	.21**	.42**	-		
6. IGT_S	5.25	1.38	-.57**	.47**	.18**	.37**	.80**	-	
7. TI	4.65	1.34	-.23**	.71**	.54**	.26**	.39**	.35**	-

Table 4.1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations between Measures

Note. SBCA = Solidarity-based Collective Action, CN = Collective Narcissism, RWA = Right-wing Authoritarianism, SDO = Social Dominance Orientation, IGT_R = Intergroup Threat – Realistic, IGT_S = Intergroup Threat – Symbolic, TI = Turkish identification. ** $p < .001$.


4.3. Findings Related to In-group Image Threat Manipulation

To examine the relationship between in-group image threat and SBCA, as well as the control variables which are RWA, SDO, symbolic intergroup threat, realistic intergroup threat, and Turkish identification, independent samples t-tests were conducted. Consistent with the predictions, the results revealed that participants in the in-group praise condition ($M = 4.13$, $SD = 1.77$) exhibited a significantly higher willingness to engage in SBCAs compared to those in the in-group criticism condition ($M = 3.59$, $SD = 1.88$, $p = .008$). As expected, the effect of group image threat on control variables was not significant (all $p.s > .05$).

4.4. Model Testing

To examine the potential moderator role of in-group image threat manipulation in the relationship between CN and SBCA, a moderation analysis was conducted using the PROCESS bootstrapping command in SPSS with 10,000 iterations and 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals (PROCESS 3.5 - Model 1; Hayes 2013). Additionally, we included RWA, SDO, symbolic intergroup threat, realistic intergroup threat, and Turkish identification as covariates in the model. Results showed that the overall model was significant, $R^2 = .51$, $F(8, 310) = 41.01$, $p < .001$. However, CN and in-group image threat interaction was not significant ($\beta = -.05$, $SE = .11$, $p = .628$, 95% CI = $-.26, .16$). Among covariates, SDO ($\beta = -.41$, $SE = .07$, $p < .001$, 95% CI = $-.55, -.27$) and realistic intergroup threat ($\beta = -.61$, $SE = .10$, $p < .001$, 95% CI = $-.82, -.41$) significantly predicted SBCA. The moderation model is presented in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1. Moderation Model



CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

5.1. Overview of the Results

The study aimed to investigate the relationship between CN and the local community's attitudes towards solidarity with Syrian refugees in Türkiye, specifically focusing on the role of in-group image threat in this relationship. This study had three research questions derived from the relevant literature and three hypotheses generated based on these questions. The first hypothesis of the study predicted a negative correlation between participants' CN scores and their intentions for SBCA on behalf of Syrian refugees. It was expected that the SBCA scores of participants who have high CN would be lower than participants who have low CN.

The results of the study supported the first hypothesis. The analyses revealed a negative correlation between CN scores and intentions for SBCA on behalf of Syrian refugees. In other words, as participants' CN scores increased, their intentions for SBCA toward Syrian refugees decreased. On the other hand, as CN scores decreased, participants' intentions for SBCA toward Syrian refugees increased. These findings show consistency with similar studies in the literature.

Research on CN consistently reveals that CN is negatively associated with positive attitudes and prosocial behaviors (such as acting in solidarity with an outgroup in the face of an unjust situation) directed at outgroups (e.g. Hadarics, Szabó, and Kende 2020; Golec de Zavala et al. 2016), including refugees (e.g. Dyduch-Hazar et al. 2019; Gorska et al. 2020). As in line with the current study, Gorska and colleagues (2020) previously showed that Polish national CN is negatively correlated with advantaged groups' SBCA intentions with the disadvantaged outgroups. The result of the current thesis indicates that the suppressive effect of CN on SBCA intentions of advantaged group members towards disadvantaged groups is also found to be valid in the context of Türkiye. In Türkiye, the attitudes of Turks (who are in an advantageous position compared to Syrians) towards solidarity with Syrian refugees were found to be negatively correlated with their CN

scores. This finding is consistent with similar studies in the literature and holds significance in understanding the dynamics of SBCA engagement in Türkiye.

The second hypothesis of the study proposed that experimentally manipulating in-group image threat will have a significant effect on the SBCA intentions of the participants on behalf of the Syrian refugee group. It was expected that under the in-group criticism condition, participants' intentions toward SBCA on behalf of the Syrians would decrease, while in the in-group praise condition, participants' SBCA intentions would be higher compared to the in-group criticism condition.

As expected, the findings aligned with our hypotheses, indicating that participants in the in-group praise condition demonstrated a significantly greater willingness to participate in SBCA compared to those in the in-group criticism condition. This result is also consistent with previous studies. In the literature, any form of perceived threats (such as symbolic and realistic threats, intergroup anxiety, and in-group image threat) to the ingroup are associated with more negative and hostile attitudes towards outgroups (e.g. Duckitt 2006; Golec de Zavala, Cichoska, and Iskra-Golec 2013; Stephan and Stephan 2013; Hadarics, Szabó, and Kende 2020).

The last hypothesis of the study was that the relationship between CN and SBCA intentions would be moderated by the experimental manipulation of in-group image threat. It was expected that the negative relationship between CN and SBCA intentions would be more pronounced under the condition of in-group image criticism than under the in-group praise condition. Conversely, in the presence of in-group praise, the link between CN and SBCA intentions will be less pronounced compared to in-group criticism conditions.

The findings of this study did not support this hypothesis. Despite the significant effect of in-group image threat manipulation on SBCA intentions, this manipulation did not alter the relationship between collective narcissism CN and SBCA intentions.

Considering the previous study that has demonstrated the differential effect of the two in-group image threat conditions on the relationship between CN and attitudes toward outgroups, it can be seen that this finding did not reveal consistency with the previous research (Golec de Zavala, Cichoska, and Iskra-Golec 2013). In their study which they

examined the relationship between collective narcissism and intergroup hostility, Golec de Zavala, Cichoska, and Iskra-Golec (2013) found that the relationship between CN and hostile attitudes towards the out-groups becomes salient only under the condition of in-group criticism, while the significant relationship between CN and hostile attitudes disappears under the condition of in-group praise.

One distinguishing factor of the current study's results from the existing literature might be the pre-existing level of threat perception of the host community in Türkiye towards Syrians, despite the participants being randomly assigned to different ingroup image threat conditions. Due to the current conjuncture in Türkiye, the perception of threat towards Syrians is already very high (Ipsos 2016; Erdoğan 2021; Ipsos 2022). Furthermore, according to relevant literature, especially after the 9/11 attacks, immigrants from Muslim countries have been perceived as a security threat and associated with terrorism (Morey and Yaqin 2011). Syrian immigrants coming from a Muslim country are also seen to raise security concerns in Türkiye. Survey data gathered from 25 countries revealed that the society in Türkiye was the foremost advocate of the notion that 'terrorists were posing as refugees' (Ipsos 2016). On the other hand, it is known that the extended stay of Syrians in Türkiye has led to a worsening of attitudes among the local community. Long-term refugee presence has been observed to increase economic, cultural, and social concerns among local community members (Erdoğan 2021).

Findings might have been different if a refugee group, in which the local community perceived less threat or had a more neutral approach, had been chosen as the target group in this study. For example, if the same topic were studied focusing on Ukrainian refugees who came to Türkiye due to the conflict in Ukraine, the findings could show differences. Various points distinguish Syrian refugees from Ukrainian refugees. Firstly, the number of Ukrainian refugees is much lower, and secondly, the issue of Ukrainian refugees in Türkiye is not as politically charged. Ukrainian refugees do not come from a Muslim country like Syrian refugees, so the issue does not turn into a security matter in the same way for the local community. Therefore, it can be said that the perception of threat towards Ukrainian refugees may not be as high. Additionally, there is no explicit negative discourse about Ukrainian refugees from political opposition parties

and the media representation of Ukrainian refugees is also much less than that of Syrian refugees (Tiryaki 2022). To conclude, both political elites and the media do not engage with the issue of Ukrainian refugees in Türkiye as much as they do with Syrian refugees.

For example, in their studies, Golec de Zavala, Cichoska, and Iskra-Golec (2013) chose British and German people as target outgroups to investigate the relationship between Americans' CN and hostile attitudes towards outgroups under ingroup image criticism and praise conditions. The researchers stated that previous surveys have not found a negative attitude among Americans towards the British and German people, but rather a relatively positive attitude. It can be assumed that one of the important reasons that may cause differences between the studies in the literature and the results of this study is the selected target group (Syrian refugees in this case).

Moreover, the dependent variable in the Golec de Zavala and colleagues' (2013) study was also different from the current research. In that study, the dependent variable was "hostile attitudes," whereas the current study's dependent variable was "solidarity-based collective action intentions." This could be another reason for the differing results. Hostile attitudes indicate a negative attitude while measuring solidarity intentions signifies a positive attitude.

5.2. The Study's Contributions, Implications, and Constraints

The situation of Syrian refugees in Türkiye, for which the government sought temporary strategies at the beginning of the process, has gradually turned into a long-term one. Even though the exact course of the process is still not clear, it is anticipated that a sizable portion of Syrians will stay in Türkiye. It was correspondingly unavoidable and crucial to come up with effective solutions for integration and harmonization (Erdoğan 2019).

The local community in Türkiye perceives Syrians as both realistic and symbolic threats at a considerable level, leading to reduced intentions of solidarity towards them (Erdoğan 2021). As a result, this situation contributes to heightened social tensions between refugees and the local community, as also highlighted by Erdoğan (2021). In this context, understanding the social and psychological barriers to local people's solidarity

with Syrians is of great importance as it can guide policymakers at both macro and local levels in building successful integration policies and ensuring the coexistence of different cultures.

Therefore, understanding the dynamics of CN and its association with solidarity-based behaviors on behalf of out-groups, refugees in this case is crucial for promoting social cohesion and addressing intergroup conflicts. By examining the influence of CN on privileged group members' intentions to engage in SBCA with disadvantaged groups, the study sheds light on the mechanisms underlying intergroup dynamics and the potential barriers to collective action for social change.

In the current study, as part of the experimental manipulation, Turkish identity was either criticized or praised by Syrians through message content consisting of two different newspaper articles. Results showed that the manipulation was successful and two different types of news in the message contents successfully influenced the participants' attitudes towards solidarity with Syrians. It can be concluded from these results that the media plays a major role in shaping the attitudes of the local community in Türkiye towards Syrians. The way the media presents news, commentaries, and visuals about Syrians can influence the public's perception regarding Syrians and this issue emerges as an important one in terms of media ethics and responsibility. To conclude, the result of the current study is valuable since it demonstrates the media's potential influence on the formation of the local community's behavioral intentions toward Syrians through experimental manipulation.

Prior studies suggested that manipulating perceived threat could provide clarity on the relationship between CN and SBCA participation intentions of advantaged group members (Gorska et al. 2020). The present study aims to fill this methodological gap in the literature by manipulating the threat to the in-group image and uncovering the underlying mechanisms of this relationship. In doing so, the current research seeks to contribute valuable insights to the existing body of knowledge.

Özkan and colleagues (2022) have recently highlighted that previous studies on collective action in social psychology literature have primarily focused on factors within the SIMCA, while potential factors such as perceived threat have been overlooked. This study aims to fill this gap in the literature by examining the in-group image threat, a factor

that has not received much attention in the field while investigating the intentions to engage in collective action. In doing so, this research seeks to address an underexplored aspect of the topic and contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of collective action.

Previous research draws attention to the limited number of studies that specifically examine the collective action intentions of privileged group members within the Türkiye context. Furthermore, research highlights the necessity to explore the replicability of factors that influence collective action intentions in non-WEIRD contexts, such as Türkiye (Doğruyol, Alper, and Yilmaz 2019; Uluğ, Solak, and Acar 2022).

This study has both strengths and significant practical, methodological, and theoretical contributions, but it also has certain limitations and constraints. Some of these limitations are related to the sample selection. One of the main limitations arising from the chosen sample is the age range and educational levels of the participants. The participants were aged between 18 and 44 years, with an average age of 22.4. Studies have shown that older individuals tend to harbor more prejudice and hold more negative attitudes towards outgroups, particularly compared to younger generations (Gonsalkorale, Sherman, and Klauer 2009; Gonnot, Dražanová, and Brunori 2020). Moreover, the entire sample of the study consisted of university students. Previous research in the literature has suggested that as educational levels decrease, negative attitudes toward outgroups may increase. Moreover, concerning attitudes towards migration, it has been observed that individuals with higher levels of education tend to exhibit relatively more positive attitudes towards immigration and immigrants (Gonnot, Dražanová, and Brunori 2020). Therefore, it should be considered that the results based on survey data collected from relatively educated and young adult individuals may differ for older generations or those with lower educational levels, such as primary school or high school graduates. Conducting this study while controlling for age and educational level may lead to changes in the findings.

Another potential limitation of the study was that variables such as political orientation and religiosity, which are associated with SBCA intentions in the literature and measured in the study's questionnaire, were not included in the analysis of the study.

By including these two variables in the analysis, the results could be reinterpreted, and the possible moderating role of these variables could be examined. Moreover, during the data cleaning process, 66 participants who declared that they were not university students were excluded from the dataset since the survey was initially planned to be conducted only with university students. However, it could have been examined whether including these 66 participants in the dataset and reanalyzing the results with them would alter any of the study's results.

The overwhelming majority of the sample in the study consisted of individuals living in three major cities of Türkiye, namely Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul (87%). However, the proportion of Syrians in the local population can vary significantly from city to city. For instance, provinces that share a border with Syria, such as Kilis and Gaziantep, have a higher proportion of Syrians compared to the local population (PMM 2023). This higher proportion increases the interaction between the local population and the refugees. Erdogan's study (2021) demonstrates that the attitudes of the local population residing in border provinces towards Syrians are more negative compared to those in metropolitan cities.

It should be acknowledged that data collected mainly from individuals living in major cities like Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul might not be entirely representative of these regions, and the findings could vary in regions such as Kilis and Gaziantep, where Syrians are more densely populated. Therefore, it is important to consider that the results may differ in regions with higher concentrations of Syrians.

However, even though the proportion of Syrians to the local population may not be as dense as in border regions, the provinces of Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara are among the top 10 cities with the highest number of Syrian populations (PMM 2023). Considering that these cities are the three largest and most populated cities of Türkiye, it is thought that the results of the study may reflect the local population in Türkiye.

Another possible limitation of the study was related to the operationalization of the dependent variable which is SBCA. This study measures participants' intentions to engage in collective action rather than directly measuring their actual collective action participation behaviors. Indeed, while there are studies in the literature showing that

behavioral intentions can significantly predict actual behaviors (Webb and Sheeran 2006), it is also known that there can be discrepancies between people's self-reported intentions and their actual engagement in collective action (Cichoska et al. 2018).

5.3. Directions for Further Research

Similar to this thesis, most of the studies in the collective action literature focus on the motivating factors behind collective action and its precursors. Similarly, research on collective action in Türkiye also pays less attention to the outcomes of collective action. There are very few studies in the literature that specifically focus on the extent to which collective actions achieve the desired social change, which is the ultimate goal of most collective actions. Some of the findings related to outcomes of collective action in the literature are as follows: reducing bias, heightened solidarity intentions toward the outgroups (Acar and Uluğ 2016), formation of new identity dimensions such as politicized identity (Drury and Reicher 2000; Acar 2018), empowerment (Stewart et al. 2019), improvement in favorable emotions and psychological well-being (Vestergren et al. 2017), as well as change at the societal level (Iyer and Leach 2009). Particularly, in the social psychology literature on collective action, researchers tend to examine individuals, intragroup, and intergroup relations in the process leading to collective action rather than focusing on the effects of collective actions on the level of social change. In future studies in the collective action literature, researchers can also focus on the outcomes of collective actions, in addition to examining the predictors of collective action.

Research on collective action in Türkiye suggests that with the attempted coup in 2016, Türkiye began to transform into a more authoritarian country (Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2016). Any form of protest, including posting dissident social media content or expressing any anti-government opinions, is perceived as a threat to the government and is met with harsher repression (Gürsoy 2017). In countries like Türkiye, which are experiencing a growing trend of authoritarianism, the potential costs of engaging in collective actions are likely to be higher compared to more democratic countries (Uluğ, Solak, and Acar 2022). It is crucial for future research to investigate the intentions behind collective action, considering the context-specific costs that potentially emerge.

This study was conducted during the general election process in Türkiye, during which the refugee issue was a hot topic. As mentioned before, the issue of Syrian refugees became one of the most debated topics during the election process (Tahiroğlu 2022). Especially in the pre-election period, opposition parties fueled the perception of threat and hostile attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Future studies could examine whether there has been any change in the attitudes of the local population towards Syrian refugees in Türkiye based on the policies pursued after the election.





CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis seeks to explore the relationship between CN and the local community's attitudes toward SBCA participation on behalf of Syrians in Türkiye. The current study also aims to explore how manipulating the in-group image threat affects the local community's intentions to engage in collective action based on solidarity with the Syrians in Türkiye. The study particularly focused potential moderating role of in-group image threat in the relationship between CN and SBCA intentions of the local community concerning Syrians. The results of the study reveal a significant negative correlation between CN scores and intentions for SBCA towards Syrians. As participants' CN scores increased, their intentions for SBCA decreased, and conversely, as CN scores decreased, participants' intentions for SBCA increased. These findings are consistent with previous studies in the literature (Gorska et al. 2020). The study results also showed a statistically significant association between in-group image threat manipulation and participants' intentions for SBCA towards the Syrians. Specifically, participants under the in-group praise condition showed a significantly higher willingness to engage in SBCA compared to those subjected to in-group criticism. Another finding of the study was that, although the manipulation of in-group image threat had a statistically significant effect on SBCA intentions of the local community members, it did not moderate the relationship between CN and SBCA intentions. When all the contributions and constraints are considered, this study offers a fresh perspective for future research on collective action literature and solidarity with Syrians in Türkiye. To conclude, the study's findings can be adopted as a guide by both governmental organizations and migration-related local and international non-profit organizations to promote intergroup solidarity, enhance social cohesion, and address intergroup conflicts between the local community and refugee groups.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrams, Dominic, and Michael A. Hogg. "Comments on the motivational status of self-esteem in social identity and intergroup discrimination." *European Journal of social psychology* 18, no. 4 (1988): 317-334. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420180403

Acar, Yasemin Gülsüm, and Özden Melis Uluğ. "Examining prejudice reduction through solidarity and togetherness experiences among Gezi Park activists in Turkey." *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 4, no.1 (2016): 166-179.

Agostini, Maximilian, and Martijn van Zomeren. "Toward a comprehensive and potentially cross-cultural model of why people engage in collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of four motivations and structural constraints." *Psychological Bulletin* 147, no. 7 (2021): 667.

Akdeniz, Ercüment. 2020. "Bunu da yaptılar: Mülteciler savaş enstrümanı." *Evrensel Daily News*. March 2, 2020. Accessed April 16, 2023. <https://www.evrensel.net/yazi/85848/bunu-da-yaptilar-multeciler-savas-enstrumani>

Akkuş, Birol, Tom Postmes, Katherine Stroebe, and Gamze Baray. "Cultures of conflict: Protests, violent repression, and community values." *British Journal of social psychology* 59, no. 1 (2020): 49-65. <https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12328>

Aksoy, Zeynep. "Uluslararası Göç ve Kültürlerarası İletişim." *Journal of International Social Research* 5, no.20 (2012).

Al Jazeera. 2022. "As Turkey's economic crisis grows, politicians spar over refugees." May 14, 2022. Accessed 20 July 2023. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/14/as-turkeys-economic-crisis-grows-politicians-spar-over-refugees>.

Allport, Gordon Willard. *The nature of prejudice*. New York, NY: Addison-Wesley, 1954.

Anadolu Agency. 2023. "Thousands march against racism, asylum bill in London." March 18, 2023. Accessed June 10, 2023. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/thousands-march-against-racism-asylum-bill-in-london/2849545>

Andrew L. Stewart, Colin Wayne Leach, Rezarta Bilali, Ayşe Betül Çelik, and Atilla Cidam. "Explaining different orientations to the 2013 Gezi Park demonstrations in Istanbul, Turkey." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 58, no. 4 (2019): 829-852.

Ardic, Nurullah. "Understanding the 'Arab Spring': justice, dignity, religion and international politics." *Afro Eurasian Studies* 1, no. 1 (2012): 8-52.

Bäckström, Martin, and Fredrik Björklund. "Structural modeling of generalized prejudice: The role of social dominance, authoritarianism, and empathy." *Journal of Individual Differences* 28, no. 1 (2007): 10-17. <https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-0001.28.1.10>

Bandura, Albert. *Self-efficacy: The exercise of control*. W H Freeman/Times Books/ Henry Holt & Co, 1997.

BBC Turkish. 2016. "Erdoğan'dan AB'ye mülteci krizi tepkisi: Alnımızda enayi yazmıyor." Accessed June 2023. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/02/160211_erdogan_omer_celik_multeciler_aciklama.

Becker, Julia C. "Ideology and the promotion of social change." *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences* 34 (2020): 6-11.

Becker, Julia C. "The system-stabilizing role of identity management strategies: Social creativity can undermine collective action for social change." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 103, no. 4 (2012): 647.

Becker, Julia C., and Nicole Tausch. "A dynamic model of engagement in normative and non-normative collective action: Psychological antecedents, consequences, and barriers." *European Review of Social Psychology* 26. Routledge, (2017): 43-92.

Becker, Julia C., Stephen C. Wright, Micah E. Lubensky, and Shelly Zhou. "Friend or ally: Whether cross-group contact undermines collective action depends on what

advantaged group members say (or don't say)." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 39, no. 4 (2013): 442-455. doi:10.1177/0146167213477155

Becker, Sascha O., and Andreas Ferrara. "Consequences of forced migration: A survey of recent findings." *Labour Economics* 59 (2019): 1-16.

Berry, John W. "Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation." *Applied psychology* 46, no. 1 (1997): 5-34.

Birlikte Yaşamak İstiyoruz İnisiyatifi (@biraradayasamak). 2023. "Dünya Mülteciler Gününde, Kadıköy Süreyya Operası önünde basın açıklamamızı gerçekleştirdik." Post on X. June 20, 2023. <https://twitter.com/biraradayasamak/status/1671213348187193344>

Brewer, Marilynn B. "In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis." *Psychological bulletin* 86, no. 2 (1979): 307-324.

Brewer, Marilynn B. "The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love and outgroup hate?". *Journal of social issues* 55, no. 3 (1999): 429-444. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00126

Brown, Cynthia Stokes. *Refusing Racism: White Allies and the Struggle for Civil Rights*. Teachers College Press, 2002.

Cai, Huajian, and Peter Gries. "National narcissism: Internal dimensions and international correlates." *PsyCh Journal* 2, no. 2 (2013): 122-132

Cakal, Huseyin, Miles Hewstone, Gerhard Schwär, and Anthony Heath. "An investigation of the social identity model of collective action and the 'sedative effect of intergroup contact among Black and White students in South Africa." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 50, no. 4 (2011): 606-627. doi: 10.1111/bjso.2011.50.issue-4

Çakal, Huseyin, Miles Hewstone, Meltem Güler, and Anthony Heath. "Predicting support for collective action in the conflict between Turks and Kurds: Perceived threats as a mediator of intergroup contact and social identity." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 19, no. 6 (2016): 732-752.

Caughie, Pamela L. " Introduction: Theorizing the 'First Wave' Globally." *Feminist Review* 95 (2010): 5-9. doi:10.1057/fr.2009.63

Chang, Linda W., Amy R. Krosch, and Mina Cikara. "Effects of intergroup threat on mind, brain, and behavior." *Current opinion in psychology* 11, (2016): 69-73.

Cichocka, Aleksandra, Kristof Dhont, and Arti P. Makwana. "On self-love and outgroup hate: Opposite effects of narcissism on prejudice via social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism." *European Journal of personality* 31, no. 4 (2017): 366-384.

Cichocka, Aleksandra, Marta Marchlewska, and Agnieszka Golec De Zavala. "Does self-love or self-hate predict conspiracy beliefs? Narcissism, self-esteem, and the endorsement of conspiracy theories." *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 7, no. 2 (2016): 157-166.

Çirakoğlu, Okan Cem, Kürşad Demirutku, and Oğuzcan Karakaya. "The mediating role of perceived threat in the relationship between casual contact and attitudes towards Syrian refugees in Turkey." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 34, no. 3 (2021): 2984-2999.

Cohen-Chen, Smadar, Eran Halperin, Richard J. Crisp, and James J. Gross. "Hope in the Middle East: Malleability beliefs, hope, and the willingness to compromise for peace." *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 5, no. 1 (2014): 67-75.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550613484499>

Cowling, Misha Mei, Joel R. Anderson, and Rose Ferguson. "Prejudice-relevant correlates of attitudes towards refugees: A meta-analysis." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 32, no. 3 (2019): 502-524.

Crocker, Jennifer, and Lora E. Park. "The costly pursuit of self-esteem." *Psychological bulletin* 130, no. 3 (2004): 392-414.

Crowson, H. Michael, Teresa K. DeBacker, and Stephen J. Thoma. "Does authoritarianism predict post-9/11 attitudes?." *Personality and Individual Differences* 39, no. 7 (2005): 1273-1283.

Demirdağ, Ahmet, and Derya Hasta. "Threat perception and perspective taking as mediators between competitive victimhood and evaluations of collective action: The Gezi Park protests." *Political Psychology* 40, no. 5 (2019): 953-971.

Dixon, John, Mark Levine, Steve Reicher, and Kevin Durrheim. "Beyond prejudice: Relational inequality, collective action, and social change revisited." *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 35, no. 6 (2012): 451-466.

Doğruyol, Burak, Sinan Alper, and Onurcan Yılmaz. "The five-factor model of the moral foundations theory is stable across WEIRD and non-WEIRD cultures." *Personality and Individual Differences* 151, (2019): 109547.

Drury, John, and Steve Reicher. "Collective action and psychological change: The emergence of new social identities." *British journal of social psychology* 39, no. 4 (2000): 579-604. <https://doi.org/10.1348/014466600164642>

Dyduch-Hazar, Karolina, Blazej Mrozinski, and Agnieszka Golec de Zavala. "Collective narcissism and in-group satisfaction predict opposite attitudes toward refugees via attribution of hostility." *Frontiers in psychology* 10 (2019): 1901.

Ellemers, Naomi, Jojanneke van der Toorn, Yavor Paunov, and Thed van Leeuwen. "The psychology of morality: A review and analysis of empirical studies published from 1940 through 2017." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 23, no. 4 (2019): 332-366. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868318811759>

Ellemers, Naomi. "Individual upward mobility and the perceived legitimacy of intergroup relations." *The psychology of legitimacy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice, and intergroup relations* (2001): 205-222.

Ellemers, Naomi. "The influence of socio-structural variables on identity management strategies." *European review of social psychology* 4, no. 1 (1993): 27-57.

Erdoğan, M. Murat. "Securitization from Society" and "Social Acceptance": Political Party-Based Approaches in Turkey to Syrian Refugees." *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 17, no. 68 (2020): 73-92.

Erdoğan, M. Murat. 2020. "Türkiye'deki Suriyeliler: 9 Yılın Kısa Muhasebesi." *Perspektif Online*. February 28, 2020. Accessed April 2023. <https://www.perspektif.online/turkiyedeki-suriyeliler-9-yilin-kisa-muhasebesi/>.

Erdoğan, Murat. "Syrian-Barometer 2021: A Framework for Achieving Social Cohesion with Syrians in Turkey." Ankara: Eğiten Book Publishing. 2022.

<https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2023/01/SB-2021-TR-MME-FINAL-19-Ocak-2023.pdf>

Euronews Turkish. 2021a. "Bolu Belediye Başkanı Tanju Özcan'a tepki: Anayasa'ya aykırı, vicdan ve insanlıkla bağdaşmıyor" July 27, 2021. Accessed July 9 2023.

<https://tr.euronews.com/2021/07/27/bolu-belediye-baskan-tanju-ozcan-a-tepki-anayasa-ya-ayk-r-vicdan-ve-insanl-kla-bagdas-m-yor> .

Euronews Turkish. 2021b. "Kılıçdaroğlu: 'I will send all refugees back to their countries within 2 years'". September 16, 2021. Accessed July 21, 2023.

<https://tr.euronews.com/2021/09/16/k-l-cdaroglu-butun-s-g-nmac-lar-en-gec-2-y-l-icinde-ulkelerine-gonderecegim> .

Euronews Turkish. 2022. "İYİ Parti lideri Akşener, Suriyelilerin geri gönderilmesi için devletten görev istedi", Euronews, 11 May, 2022. Accessed July 21, 2023.

<https://tr.euronews.com/2022/05/11/iyi-parti-lideri-aksener-suriyelilerin-geri-gonderilmesi-icin-devletten-gorev-istedi>.

Euronews. 2022. "Solidarity with Iran as worldwide protests staged over death of Mahsa Amini." October 1, 2022. Accessed 19 July 2023.

Fischer, Agneta H., and Ira J. Roseman. "Beat them or ban them: the characteristics and social functions of anger and contempt." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 93, no. 1 (2007): 103-115. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.1.103>

Golec de Zavala, Agnieszka et al. "Collective narcissism and its social consequences." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 97, no. 6 (2009): 1074.

doi:10.1037/a0016904

Golec de Zavala, Agnieszka, Aleksandra Cichocka, and Irena Iskra-Golec. "Collective narcissism moderates the effect of in-group image threat on intergroup hostility." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 104, no. 6 (2013): 1019.

Golec de Zavala, Agnieszka, Aleksandra Cichocka, and Michał Bilewicz. "The paradox of in-group love: Differentiating collective narcissism advances understanding of the relationship between in-group and out-group attitudes." *Journal of Personality* 81, no. 1 (2013): 16-28.

Golec de Zavala, Agnieszka, Aleksandra Cichocka, Roy Eidelson, and Nuwan Jayawickreme. "Collective narcissism and its social consequences." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 97, no. 6 (2009): 1074.

Golec de Zavala, Agnieszka, and Aleksandra Cichocka. "Collective narcissism and anti-Semitism in Poland." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 15, no. 2 (2012): 213-229.

Golec de Zavala, Agnieszka, and Christopher M. Federico. "Collective narcissism and the growth of conspiracy thinking over the course of the 2016 United States presidential election: A longitudinal analysis." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 48, no. 7 (2018): 1011-1018.

Golec de Zavala, Agnieszka, Christopher M. Federico, Constantine Sedikides, Rita Guerra, Dorottya Lantos, Błażej Mroziński, Marzena Cypryńska, and Tomasz Baran. "Low self-esteem predicts out-group derogation via collective narcissism, but this relationship is obscured by in-group satisfaction." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 119, no. 3 (2020): 741.

Golec de Zavala, Agnieszka, Müjde Peker, Rita Guerra, and Tomasz Baran. "Collective narcissism predicts hypersensitivity to in-group insult and direct and indirect retaliatory intergroup hostility." *European Journal of Personality* 30, no. 6 (2016): 532-551.

Golec de Zavala, Agnieszka. "Collective narcissism and intergroup hostility: The dark side of 'in-group love'." *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 5, no. 6 (2011): 309-320.

Gonnot, Jérôme, Lenka Dražanová, and Claudia Brunori. "Global trends and continental differences in attitudes to immigration: thinking outside the Western box." European University Institute, 2020.

Gonsalkorale, Karen, Jeffrey W. Sherman, and Karl Christoph Klauer. "Aging and prejudice: Diminished regulation of automatic race bias among older adults." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 45, no. 2 (2009): 410-414.

Górska, Paulina, Anna Stefaniak, Katarzyna Malinowska, Katarzyna Lipowska, Marta Marchlewska, Magdalena Budziszewska, and Oliwia Maciantowicz. "Too great to act in solidarity: The negative relationship between collective narcissism and solidarity-based collective action." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 50, no. 3 (2020): 561-578.

Gökçiçek, Ayata, Pınar Çağlı, İdil Elveriş, Sevinç Eryılmaz, İdil Işıl Gül, Ulaş Karan, Cansu Muratoğlu, Ezgi Taboğlu, Lami Bertan Tokuzlu, and Burcu Yeşiladalı. *Gezi Parkı Olayları: İnsan Hakları Hukuku ve Siyasi Söylem Işığında Bir İnceleme*. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013.

Hall, Jacquelyn Dowd. "The long civil rights movement and the political uses of the past." *The Journal of American History* 91, no. 4 (2005): 1233-1263.

Hayes, Andrew F. "Mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis." *Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis: A regression-based approach* no. 1 (2013): 20.

Hofstede, Geert. *Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations*. Sage, 2001.

<https://www.euronews.com/2022/10/01/solidarity-with-iran-as-worldwide-protests-staged-over-death-of-mahsa-amini>

Hürriyetoğlu, Heyyem. "Gruplar arası tehdit ve empatinin Suriyeli göçmenlere yönelik açık ve örtük tutumlar üzerindeki etkisi." Unpublished Master's Thesis, Hacettepe University, 2017.

Independent. 2023. "Hundreds at refugees welcome protest in Dublin to counter anti-asylum demonstrations." January 19, 2023. Accessed June 10, 2023.

<https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/hundreds-at-refugees-welcome-protest-in-dublin-to-counter-anti-asylum-demonstrations/42298412.html>

Ipsos. 2022. "Ipsos World Refugee Day 2022: Global attitudes towards hosting refugees.". June 2022. Accessed July 2023.

<https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2022-06/Ipsos%20World%20Refugee%20Day%202022%20Global%20Part%202%20-%20Global%20attitudes%20towards%20hosting%20refugees.pdf>

Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO). 2023. "Iran: New Report Finds Increase in Executions in 2021." April, 2023. Accessed 1 July 2023. <https://iranhr.net/en/articles/5795/>

Islam, Mir Rabiul, and Miles Hewstone. "Dimensions of contact as predictors of intergroup anxiety, perceived out-group variability, and out-group attitude: An integrative model." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 19, no. 6 (1993): 700-710.

ITV News Granada Reports. 2023. "Crowds gather for refugees welcome rally following Knowsley violence." February 18, 2023. Accessed July 10, 2023.

<https://www.itv.com/news/granada/2023-02-18/crowds-gather-for-refugees-welcome-rally-following-knowesley-violence>

Iyer, Aarti, Colin Wayne Leach, and Faye J. Crosby. "White guilt and racial compensation: The benefits and limits of self-focus." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 29, no. 1 (2003): 117-129. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167202238377>

Jost, John T., Brian A. Nosek, and Samuel D. Gosling. "Ideology: Its resurgence in social, personality, and political psychology." *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 3, no. 2 (2008): 126-136.

Jost, John T., Julia Becker, Danny Osborne, and Vivienne Badaan. "Missing in (collective) action: Ideology, system justification, and the motivational antecedents of two types of protest behavior." *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 26, no. 2 (2017): 99-108.

Jost, John T., Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Brian A. Nosek. "A decade of system justification theory: Accumulated evidence of conscious and unconscious bolstering of the status quo." *Political Psychology* 25, no. 6 (2004): 881-919.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00402.x>

Karataş, Şerif. 2020. "Doç. Dr. Cenk Saraçoğlu: Kapitalizmin çelişkileri olduğu müddetçe sınırlar zorlanacak." *Evrensel Daily News*. March 10, 2020. Accessed June 18, 2023. <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/399066/doc-dr-cenk-saracoglu-kapitalizmin-celiskileri-oldugu-muddetce-sinirlar-zorlanacak>

Kasımoğlu, Merve Özenç, and Marcel Mečiar. "Trans/national Acts of Solidarity During the 2021 Boğaziçi University Protests: On Twitter and Beyond." *Contemporary Issues in Politics & International Relations* (2021): 119.

Kasımoğlu, Merve Özenç, and Marcel Mečiar. "Trans/national Acts of Solidarity During the 2021 Boğaziçi University Protests: On Twitter and Beyond." *Contemporary Issues in Politics & International Relations* (2021): 119.

Kernis, Michael H. "Toward a conceptualization of optimal self-esteem." *Psychological inquiry* 14, no. 1 (2003): 1-26.

Kirişci, Kemal. *Syrian Refugees and Turkey's Challenges: Going Beyond Hospitality*. Washington, DC: Brookings, 2014, 1-46.

Klandermans, Pieter Gijbertus. *The social psychology of protest*. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1997.

Kohut, Heinz. "Thoughts on narcissism and narcissistic rage." *The psychoanalytic study of the child* 27, no. 1 (1972): 360-400.

Leach, Colin Wayne, Martijn van Zomeren, Sven Zebe, Michael L. W. Vliek, Sjoerd F. Pennekamp, Bertjan Doosje, Jaap W. Ouwerkerk, Russell Spears. "Group-level self-definition and self-investment: a hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group Identification." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 95, no. 1 (2008): 144.

Levin, Shana, Christopher M. Federico, Jim Sidanius, and Joshua L. Rabinowitz. "Social dominance orientation and intergroup bias: The legitimation of favoritism for high-status groups." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 28, no. 2 (2002): 144-157.

Loescher, Gil, Alexander Betts, and James Milner. *UNHCR: The politics and practice of refugee protection into the 21st century*. Routledge, 2008.

Lyons-Padilla, Sarah, Michele J. Gelfand, Hedieh Mirahmadi, Mehreen Farooq, and Marieke van Egmond. "Belonging nowhere: Marginalization & radicalization risk among Muslim immigrants." *Behavioral Science & Policy* 1, no. 2 (2015): 1-12.

McAuliffe, Marie, and Anna Triandafyllidou. "World Migration Report." IOM, 2022. <https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2022>

McGarty, Craig, Ana-maria Bliuc, Emma F. Thomas and Renata Bongiorno. "Collective action as the material expression of opinion-based group membership." *Journal of Social Issues* 65, no. 4 (2009): 839-857. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2009.01627.x>

McIntosh, Peggy. "White privilege: Unpacking the invisible knapsack. Excerpt from White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of coming to see Correspondences through Work in Women's Studies." *Wellesley College Center for Research on Women* (1988): 76-87.

Mızrak, Baransel. "Amerika'da Ayrımcı Politikalar ve Siyahi Mücadele Tarihi." *İHH İnsani ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi* 33 (2017): 1-25.

Morf, Carolyn C., and Frederick Rhodewalt. "Unraveling the paradoxes of narcissism: A dynamic self-regulatory processing model." *Psychological inquiry* 12, no. 4 (2001): 177-196.

Mummendey, Amelie, Thomas Kessler, Andreas Klink, and Rosemarie Mielke. "Strategies to cope with negative social identity: predictions by social identity theory and relative deprivation theory." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 76, no. 2 (1999): 229. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.76.2.229>

Olteanu, Alexandra, Ingmar Weber, and Daniel Gatica-Perez. "Characterizing the demographics behind the #blacklivesmatter movement." *2016 AAAI spring symposium series*. 2016.

Orhan, Oytun. "Suriye Türkmenleri: Siyasal Hareketler ve Askeri Yapılanma." *Middle Eastern Analysis/Ortadoğu Analiz* 5, no. 51 (2013).

Osborne, Danny, John T. Josh, Julia Becker, Vivienne Badaan, and Chris G. Sibley. "Protesting to challenge or defend the system? A system justification perspective on

collective action." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 49, no. 2 (2019): 244-269.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2522>

Özdemir, Çağatay. "Suriye'de İç Savaşın Nedenleri: Otokratik Yönetim mi, Bölgesel ve Küresel Güçler mi?" *Bilgi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, no. 2 (2016): 81-102.

Özkan, Zafer, Halime Ünver, Büşra Kızık, Ertuğrul Gazi Eraslan, and Hüseyin Çakal. "Sosyal Psikoloji Perspektifinden Kolektif Eylemlere Katılmamanın Belirleyicileri Üzerine Bir Derleme." (2022).

Özkeçeci, Hilal H. "The role of contact and the perception of threat in prejudice towards Syrians in Turkey." Yayınlanmamış yüksek lisans tezi. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, İstanbul (2017): 14.

Piotrowski, Jarosław, Joanna Rózycka-Tran, Tomasz Baran, and Magdalena Zemojtel-Piotrowska. "Zero-sum Thinking as Mediator of the Relationship of National Attitudes with (Un)willingness to Host Refugees in Own Country." *International Journal of Psychology* 54, no. 6 (2019): 722-730.

Presidency of Migration Management. 2014. "Temporary Protection." Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Interior. October 2014. Accessed July 9, 2023.
<https://www.goc.gov.tr/gecici-koruma5638>.

Reimer, Nils Karl, Julia C. Becker, Angelika Benz, Oliver Christ, Kristof Dhont, Ulrich Klocke, Sybille Neji, Magdalena Rychlowska, Katharina Schmid, and Miles Hewstone. "Intergroup contact and social change: Implications of negative and positive contact for collective action in advantaged and disadvantaged groups." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 43, no. 1 (2017): 121-136.

Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior. "Temporary Protection Regulation". Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey. October 13, 2014. Accessed July 19, 2023.
<http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/10/20141022-15.html> .

Sağsen, İlhan. "Arap baharı, Türk dış politikası ve dış algılaması." *Ortadoğu Analiz* 3, no. 31-32 (2011).

- Schwartz, Shalom H. "The 7 Schwartz cultural value orientation scores for 80 countries." *Research Gate Publication* (2008).
- Selvanathan, Hema Preya, Pirathat Techakesari, Linda R. Tropp, and Fiona Kate Barlow. "Whites for racial justice: How contact with Black Americans predicts support for collective action among White Americans." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 21, no. 6 (2018): 893-912.
- Şen, Gülriz. "Mehsa Emininin Ardından İranda Kadın Hayat ve Özgürlük". *Women in Foreign Policy*. (2022).
https://www.academia.edu/88784208/Mehsa_Emininin_Ard%C4%B1ndan_%C4%B0randa_Kad%C4%B1n_Hayat_ve_O_zgu_rlu_k
- Simon, Bernd, and Bert Klandermans. "Politicized collective identity: A social psychological analysis." *American psychologist* 56, no. 4 (2001): 319.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.56.4.319>
- Stenner, Karen. "Three kinds of "conservatism". " *Psychological Inquiry* 20, no. 2-3 (2009): 142-159.
- Stewart, Andrew L., Felicia Pratto, Fouad Bou Zeineddine, Joseph Sweetman, Véronique Eicher, Laurent Licata... and Jacquélien van Stekelenburg. "International support for the Arab uprisings: Understanding sympathetic collective action using theories of social dominance and social identity." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 19, no. 1 (2016): 6-26.
- Stewart, Tracie L., Ioana M. Latu, Nyla R. Branscombe, Nia L. Phillips, and H. Ted Denney. "White privilege awareness and efficacy to reduce racial inequality improve White Americans' attitudes toward African Americans." *Journal of Social Issues* 68, no. 1 (2012): 11-27. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2012.01733.x>
- Stürmer, Stefan, and Bernd Simon. "Collective action: Towards a dual-pathway model." *European Review of Social Psychology* 15, no. 1 (2004): 59-99.

Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. "The social identity theory of inter group behavior." in S Worchel & WG Austin (Eds) *Psychology of intergroup relations*. Chicago: Nelson 3 (1986).

Tajfel, Henri, John Turner. "An integrative theory of intergroup conflict." *Organizational identity: A reader* 56, no. 65 (1979): 9780203505984-16.

Tajfel, Henri. "The achievement of inter-group differentiation." In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between social groups*. London: Academic Press. (1978): 77-100.

Tausch, Nicole, and Julia C. Becker. "Emotional reactions to success and failure of collective action as predictors of future action intentions: A longitudinal investigation in the context of student protests in Germany." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 52, no. 3 (2013): 525-542. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.2012.02109.x>

Tetlock, Philip E. "Social functionalist frameworks for judgment and choice: intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors." *Psychological Review* 109, no. 3 (2002): 451. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.109.3.451>

The Local Germany. 2017. "No ban, no wall: Hundreds protest Trump in heart of Berlin." February 4, 2017. Accessed February, 2023. <https://www.thelocal.de/20170204/no-ban-no-wall-hundreds-protest-trump-in-heart-of-berlin>

Thomas, Emma F., Kenneth I. Mavor, and Craig McGarty. "Social identities facilitate and encapsulate action-relevant constructs: A test of the social identity model of collective action." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 15, no. 1 (2012): 75-88.

Turkish Statistical Institute. "Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi (ADNKS) 2022." Accessed July 9, 2023. <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Istatistiklerle-Genclik-2022-49670>.

Uluğ, Özden Melis, and Linda R. Tropp. "Witnessing racial discrimination shapes collective action for racial justice: Enhancing awareness of privilege among advantaged groups." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 51, no. 3 (2021): 248-261. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12731>

Uluğ, Özden Melis, and Yasemin Gülsüm Acar. "What happens after the protests? Understanding protest outcomes through multi-level social change." *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 24, no. 1 (2018): 44.

Uluğ, Özden Melis, Nevin Solak, and Yasemin Gülsüm Acar. "16 Collective Action in Turkey: What Do We Know and Where Do We Go Next?." *Examining Complex Intergroup Relations: Through the Lens of Turkey* (2022): 332.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). "Syria Emergency." Accessed July 2023. <https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html>

Uysal, Mete Sefa, and Serap Arslan Akfırat. "Formation of an emergent protestor identity: Applying the EMSICA to the Gezi Park protests." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 25, no. 2 (2022): 527-539.

Uysal, Mete Sefa, Özden Melis Uluğ, Betük Kanık, and Aslı Ayemir. "The liberation of LGBTQ+ will also liberate heterosexuals": Heterosexual feminist women's participation in solidarity-based collective action for LGBTQ+ rights." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 52, no. 2 (2022): 377-390.

Van Zomeren, Martijn, Russel Spears, Agneta. H. Fischer, and Colin W. Leach. "Put your money where your mouth is! Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 87, no. 5 (2004): 649.

Van Zomeren, Martijn, Tom Postmes, and Russell Spears. "On conviction's collective consequences: Integrating moral conviction with the social identity model of collective action." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 51, no. 1 (2012): 52-71.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.2010.02000.x>

Van Zomeren, Martijn, Tom Postmes, and Russell Spears. "Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: a quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives." *Psychological Bulletin* 134, no. 4 (2008): 504.

Van Zomeren, Martijn, Tom Postmes, Russell Spears, and Karim Bettache. "Can moral convictions motivate the advantaged to challenge social inequality? Extending the social

identity model of collective action." *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 14, no 5 (2011): 735-753.

Van Zomeren, Martijn. "Building a Tower of Babel? Integrating core motivations and features of social structure into the political psychology of political action." *Political Psychology* 37 (2016): 87-114. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12322>

Van Zomeren, Martijn. "Four core social-psychological motivations to undertake collective action." *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 7, no. 6 (2013): 378-388. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12031>

Wright, S. C., and M. Lubensky. "The struggle for social equality: Collective action versus prejudice reduction In Demoulin S., Leyens JP & Dovidio JF (Eds.), *Intergroup misunderstandings: Impact of divergent social realities*." New York, NY: Psychology Press, (2009): 291-310.

Wright, Stephen C., Donald M. Taylor, and Fathali M. Moghaddam. "Responding to membership in a disadvantaged group: From acceptance to collective protest." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 58, no. 6 (1990): 994. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.58.6.994>

Yılıkn, Nagihan. 2023. "Dilovası'nda Suriyeliler'le yaşanan gerilim gözleri sığınmacı problemine çevirdi: Güvenlik sorunu ciddi." *Cumhuriyet*. July 5, 2023. Accessed July 20, 2023. <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/siyaset/dilovasinda-suriyelilerle-yasanan-gerilim-gozleri-siginmaci-problemine-cevirdi-guvenlik-sorunu-ciddi-209635>.

Zileli, Ümit. 2019. "Turkey's Most Urgent Security Issue: Syrians". *Sözcü*. July 23, 2019. Accessed July 15, 2023. <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2019/yazarlar/umit-zileli/turkiyenin-en-acil-beka-sorunu-suriyeliler-5243884/>.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. Informed Consent Form

Gönüllü Katılım Formu

Bu çalışma TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi Psikoloji bölümü öğretim üyesi Dr. Suzan Ceylan-Batur ve Yaşar Üniversitesi Psikoloji bölümü öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Sinan Alper gözetiminde, TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi Göç Çalışmaları bölümü yüksek lisans öğrencisi Egesu Yıldırımkanlı tarafından yürütülmektedir. Çalışmanın amacı Türkiye'deki yerel halkın kimliklerine bağlılıkla ilgili duygu ve düşüncelerine, farklı sosyal grupları ne şekilde gördüklerine ve Türkiye'deki güncel sosyal/politik konulara dair düşüncelerine dair bir fikir edinmektir.

Araştırmaya katılım tamamen gönüllülük esastır. Elde edilecek bulgular bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılacaktır. Soruların doğru ya da yanlış bir cevabı yoktur. Bu çalışmayı tamamlamak yaklaşık 20 dakikanızı alacaktır.

Çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi Göç Çalışmaları bölümü öğrencilerinden Egesu Yıldırımkanlı ile iletişim kurabilirsiniz. Araştırmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorsanız lütfen aşağıdaki ifadeyi okuyup "Evet" seçeneğini işaretleyerek "İleri" düğmesine basınız.

"Bu çalışmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katılıyorum ve istediğim zaman çalışmayı yarıda kesebileceğimi biliyorum. Vereceğim bilgilerin kimliğimde eşleştirilmeyeceğini biliyorum ve bilgilerimin bilimsel amaçlı yayımlarda kullanılmasını kabul ediyorum."

Evet Hayır

APPENDIX B. Criteria Questions

1. T.C. vatandaşı mısınız?

Evet

Hayır

2. Üniversite öğrencisi misiniz?

Evet

Hayır

APPENDIX C. In-group Image Threat: Message Contents

In-Group Criticism Condition

Gündem

Eylül, 2020

Suriyeli çocuklar Türk Bayrağı'nı indirdi

Konya'da yaşayan Suriyeli bir ailenin iki çocuğu demir korkuluklara asılı buldukları Türk bayrağını indirip çöpe attılar.

Türkiye'ye 8 yıl önce gelen Suriyeli bir ailenin 10 ve 11 yaşlarındaki çocukları demir korkuluklara asılı buldukları Türk bayrağını indirip çöpe attılar.

Bu esnada oturduğu sitenin balkonundan Suriyelileri video kaydına alan bir vatandaş bir anda çocukların Türk Bayrağını demir korkuluklardan indirip çöpe attığını görüntüledi.

Videonun sosyal medyada paylaşılması üzerine içinde bayrak sevgisi olan tüm vatandaşlar Türk bayrağının çöpe atılmasına büyük tepki gösterdi.



Suriyeli çocuklar Türk bayrağının çöpte durmasına dayanamadı

Konya'da yaşayan Suriyeli bir ailenin iki çocuğu çöpten Türk bayrağı bulup onu özenle duvara asınca günün kahramanı oldular.

Türkiye'ye 8 yıl önce gelen Suriyeli bir ailenin 10 ve 11 yaşlarındaki çocukları çöpten işlerine yarayacak eşyaları bulup onları evlerine götürüyorlar ailelerine katkı sağlıyorlardı.

Bu esnada çocuklardan biri Türk bayraklarının çöpe atıldığını fark etti.

Bir çocuk bayrakları teker teker toplarken, diğer çocuk da çöpte bulduğu büyük Türk bayrağını ilk önce öpüp daha sonra çöpün yanındaki demir korkuluklara astı.

Bayrakların çöpe atılmasına tepki gösteren vatandaşlar, Suriyeli çocukların Türk bayrağına olan saygısını takdir etti.

Türkiye'ye 8 yıl önce gelen Suriyeli ailenin çocukları bayrak sevgisini içinde hissedenerin gururu oldular.



APPENDIX D. Manipulation Check Question

Okuduđunuz haberde **Suriyelilerin sergiledikleri davranıř Tırklık imajına y6nelik** nasıl bir tutum iermektedir?

Lřtfen her bir ifade ile ne derece hemfikir olduđunuzu verilen 6lekteki sayılardan uygun olanı seerek belirtiniz.

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum	Katılıyorum	Kesinlikle katılıyorum
Ařađılayıcı	1	2	3	4	5
Yřceltici	1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX E. Imaginary Scenario and SBCA Scale

Lütfen aşağıda verilen senaryoyu dikkatlice okuyunuz. Bu senaryonun gerçekleştiği durumu hayal ederek ilgili sorulara size en çok uyan cevapları işaretleyiniz.

“Okulunuzda rektörlük tarafından alınan yeni bir karara göre okulunuzdaki Suriye uyruklu öğrenciler için öğrenim ücretlerinin ve yemekhane ücretlerinin iki katına çıkarılacağını, ayrıca Suriye uyruklu öğrencilerin okulun otoparkından, (varsa) spor salonundan ve yüzme havuzundan vb. faydalanamayacağını öğreniyorsunuz.”

Lütfen okulunuzun verdiği bu karara itiraz etmek için aşağıda verilen eylemlerde bulunmaya ne kadar istekli olduğunuzu belirtiniz. (1 = Hiç olası değil, 7 = Çok olası)

	Pek olası değil					Çok olası	
Protesto gösterisine katılmak	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Dilekçe imzalamak	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Konuyla ilgili bilgi yaymak (sosyal medyadan, WhatsApp gruplarından vb.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Bu karara karşı çıkmak için yürütülen bir kampanyaya para bağışında bulunmak	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Okul yemekhanesini boykot etmek	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX F. Collective Narcissism Scale

Lütfen her bir ifade ile ne derece hemfikir olduğunuzu verilen ölçekteki sayılardan uygun olanı seçerek belirtiniz.

- 1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum
2 = Katılmıyorum
3 = Pek katılmıyorum
4 = Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum
5 = Biraz katılıyorum
6 = Katılıyorum
7 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum

	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum		Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum			Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	
1. Diğer milletlerin, Türklerin otoritesini daha çabuk fark etmesini dilerdim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Türkler özel muameleyi hak ediyor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Türkler hak ettiği şeylerin tümünü alana kadar memnun olmayacağım.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Türklerin hak ettiği saygıyı alması için ısrar ederim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Başkaları Türkleri eleştirdiğinde bu beni çok kızdırır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Eğer Türklerin dünyada büyük bir söz hakkı olsaydı, dünya çok daha iyi bir yer olurdu.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. İnsanlar Türklerin başarılarını fark etmeyince üzülmem.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Çok fazla kişi Türklerin önemini tam olarak anlamıyor gibi görünüyor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Türklerin gerçek değeri çoğunlukla anlaşılmaz.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX G. Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale

Lütfen her bir ifade ile ne derece hemfikir olduğunuzu verilen ölçekteki sayılardan uygun olanı seçerek belirtiniz.

- 1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum
2 = Katılmıyorum
3 = Pek katılmıyorum
4 = Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum
5 = Biraz katılıyorum
6 = Katılıyorum
7 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Mevcut otorite, genel olarak pek çok şeyde haklı çıkarken, radikaller ve her şeye karşı çıkanlar cehaletlerini sergileyen boşboğazlardır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
2. Kadınlar, evlendiklerinde eşlerine itaat edeceklerine dair söz vermelidirler.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
3. Ülkemizin, bütünlüğümüze kasteden radikal yönelimleri ve kötülükleri ortadan kaldırmak için ne gerekiyorsa yapabilecek güçlü bir lidere ihtiyacı var.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
4. Eşcinseller ve lezbiyenler, herhangi biri kadar sağlıklı ve ahlaklıdır. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
5. Yönetimdeki saygın otoritelere ve dini yargılara güvenmek, toplumumuzda zihin karıştırmaya uğraşan “gürültücü ayak takımını” dinlemekten daima daha iyidir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
6. Hiç kuşkusuz, mevcut dinsel öğretilere isyan edenler ve ateistler düzenli olarak camiye gidenler kadar iyi ve erdemlidirler. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
7. Ülkemizi krizlerden kurtarmak için, geleneksel değerlerimize dönmek, sert liderleri iş başına getirmek ve kötü fikirleri yayanları susturmak gerekmektedir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
8. Çıplaklar kampının olmasında yanlış bir şey yoktur. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
9. Birçok kişiyi tedirgin etse bile ülkemizin, geleneksel uygulamalara karşı çıkma cesareti gösterebilen özgür düşünceli bireylere ihtiyacı var. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
10. İnançlarımızı ve ahlaki yapımızı yiyip bitiren geleneksel olmayan değerleri zamanında yok etmezsek, günün birinde ülkemiz yıkılacak.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		

11. Kendilerini herkesten farklı kılacak olsa bile bireyler, yaşam tarzlarını, dini inançlarını ve cinsel yönelimlerini kendileri belirlemelidir. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Eski moda adetler ve değerler hala en iyi yaşama biçimini gösteriyor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Kadınların siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik alanlarda daha aktif rollere sahip olması, okullarda din derslerinin isteğe bağlı olması ve hayvan hakları için yeni düzenlemeler yapılmasını talep ederek mevcut yasalara ve çoğunluğun görüşlerine karşı çıkanlara hayranlık duymalısınız. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Ülkemiz, kötülükleri yok ederek bizi doğru yola getirecek güçlü ve kararlı bir lidere ihtiyaç duymaktadır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Ülkemizin en iyi bireyleri hükümete karşı çıkan, dini eleştiren ve doğal kabul edilen şeyleri göz ardı edebilenlerdir. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Kürtaj, pornografi ve evlilik konusunda Allah'ın koyduğu yasalar çok geç olmadan titizlikle uygulanmalı ve bu yasaları ihlal edenler şiddetle cezalandırılmalıdır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. Bugün ülkemizde dini değerlerden yoksun, kendi amaçları için ülkeyi yıkmaya çalışan ve otorite tarafından mutlaka etkisizleştirilmeleri gereken radikal ve ahlaksız birçok kişi var.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. Kadının yeri, nerede olmak istiyorsa orasıdır. Kadının kocasına ve toplumsal geleneklere itaat etmek zorunda kaldığı günler artık geçmişte kalmıştır. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. Atalarımızın yaptıklarıyla onur duyarsak, otoritenin yapmamızı istediklerini yaparsak ve her şeyi berbat eden çürük elmaları ayıklarsak ülkemiz müthiş olur.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. Yaşamak için bir tek doğru yol yoktur; herkes kendi yolunu kendi çizmelidir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
21. Feministler ve homoseksüeller, geleneksel aile değerlerine karşı koyabilecek kadar cesur oldukları için takdir edilmelidirler. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
22. Bu ülkede işler, sorun çıkaran gruplar seslerini keser ve kendi gruplarının toplumdaki geleneksel yerini kabullenirlerse, biraz daha iyiye gidecektir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX H. Social Dominance Orientation Scale

Lütfen her bir ifade ile ne derece hemfikir olduğunuzu verilen ölçekteki sayılardan uygun olanı seçerek belirtiniz.

- 1 = Kesinlikle katılmıyorum
2 = Katılmıyorum
3 = Pek katılmıyorum
4 = Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum
5 = Biraz katılıyorum
6 = Katılıyorum
7 = Kesinlikle katılıyorum

	Kesinlikle katılmıyorum		Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum			Kesinlikle katılıyorum	
1. Bazı gruplar diğerlerinden daha üstündür.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. İstedığınızı elde etmek için bazen diğer gruplara karşı güç kullanmak gerekir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Bazı grupların hayatta diğerlerinden daha fazla şansa sahip olması kabul edilebilir bir şeydir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Hayatta öne geçmek için, bazen diğer grupların üstüne basmak gereklidir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Eğer belirli gruplar yerlerini bilselerdi, daha az sorunumuz olurdu.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Belirli grupların üstte, diğer grupların ise altta olması muhtemelen iyi bir şeydir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Daha alttaki gruplar yerlerini bilmelidir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Bazen diğer gruplara hadleri bildirilmelidir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Tüm gruplar eşit olabilseydi, iyi olurdu.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Grupların eşitliği idealimiz olmalıdır. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Tüm gruplara hayatta eşit şans verilmelidir.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Farklı grupların koşullarını eşitlemek için elimizden geleni yapmalıyız. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Toplumda gruplar arası eşitliği arttırmalıyız.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Eğer farklı gruplara daha eşit davransaydık daha az sorunumuz olurdu.*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Gelirleri olabildiğince eşit hale getirmek için çabalamalıyız. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Toplumda hiçbir grup baskın olmamalıdır. *	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX I. Intergroup Threat Scale

Realistic Threat Scale

	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum		Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum			Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	
1. Suriyelilerin gelmesi ile birlikte iş ücretlerinde düşüşler olmuştur	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Suriyeliler işlerimizi elimizden almaktadır	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Suriyelilerin bulunduğu ortamlarda suç oranları artmıştır	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Suriyeliler üzerimizde ekonomik açıdan bir yük oluşturmaktadır	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Suriyelilerin sınıvsız olarak üniversiteye girebilmesini adil bulmuyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Suriyelilerin gelmesi ile birlikte sağlık hizmetlerine erişim zorlaşmıştır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Suriyelilerin ülkemize gelişi ile yasadışı evlilikler artmıştır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Suriyeli erkekler genç kızları ve kadınları rahatsız ediyorlar.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Suriyelilerin gelmesi ile birlikte kiralarda artış olmuştur.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Symbolic Threat Scale

	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum		Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum			Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	
1. Suriyeliler, aile ilişkileri ve çocuk yetiştirme tarzları açısından bize benzemezler	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Suriyelilerin örf ve adetleri bizimkinden farklıdır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Suriyelilerin dini inanışları bizimkilerden farklıdır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Suriyeliler yaşam tarzları açısından bize benzemezler.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Suriyelilerin ahlaki değerleri bizimkinden farklıdır	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Suriyeliler kültürel değerlerimize karşı bir tehdit oluşturmaktadır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Suriyelilerin kendi örf ve adetlerini yaşatmaya çalışması Türkiye'ye zarar verir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Suriyelilerin aile ilişkileri ve çocuk yetiştirme tarzları toplumumuza zarar verir	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Suriyelilerin yaşam tarzları toplumumuz için tehdit oluşturmaktadır	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX J. Turkish Identification Scale

	Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum		Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum			Kesinlikle Katılıyorum	
1. Türklerle aramda bir bağ olduğunu hissediyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Kendimi Türklerle dayanışma içinde hissediyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Kendimi Türklere bağlı hissediyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Türk olmaktan memnunum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Türklerin gurur duyacak çok şeyi olduğunu düşünüyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. Türk olmak güzel bir şey.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. Türk olmak bana iyi bir his veriyor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8. Türk olduğum gerçeği hakkında sık sık düşünürüm.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
9. Türk olduğum gerçeği kimliğimin önemli bir parçasıdır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10. Türk olmam, kendimi nasıl gördüğümün önemli bir parçasıdır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
11. Benim ortalama bir Türk'le birçok ortak nokta vardır.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
12. Ben ortalama bir Türk'e benzerim.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
13. Türkler birbirleriyle ortak birçok özelliğe sahiptir.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
14. Türkler birbirlerine oldukça benzerler.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
15. Kendimi Türk kabul ediyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
16. Kendimi diğer Türklerle özdeşleştiriyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
17. Türk olmak bana oldukça doğal geliyor.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
18. Türkler eleştirildiğinde ben de kendimi kişisel olarak eleştirilmiş hissediyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
19. Türkler benim için önemli bir gruptur.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
20. Türklere oldukça saygı duyuyorum.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

APPENDIX K. Demographic Information Form

1. Cinsiyetiniz:

- Kadın
- Erkek
- Diğer
- Belirtmek istemiyorum

2. Yaşınız: _____

3. Yaşadığınız Şehir: _____

4. Eğitim düzeyiniz nedir?

- Ön Lisans
- Lisans
- Yüksek Lisans
- Doktora
- Açık Öğretim

5. Etnik kökeninizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?

- Türk
- Kürt
- Arap
- Diğer: _____

6. Aşağıdaki merdivenin Türkiye'deki insanların durduğu yeri temsil ettiğini düşünün. Merdivenin üstündekiler her şeyin en iyisine (en çok paraya, en iyi eğitime ve en saygın mesleklere) sahip olanlar. Merdivenin en altındakiler ise, en kötü koşullara sahip olanlar (en az paraya, en az eğitime ve en az sayılan mesleklere sahip olanlar ya da hiçbir işi olmayanlar). Bu merdivende daha yüksek basamaklarda olmanız en üstteki insanlara daha yakın olduğunuzu; daha aşağıda olmanız ise en alttaki insanlara daha yakın olduğunuzu gösterir.



Mevcut koşullarınızı düşünerek, bu merdivende kendinizi nereye yerleştirirdiniz? (1=en alt, 10 = en üst)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

7. T.C. vatandaşı mısınız?

Evet

Hayır

8. Size göre dini inancınız gündelik yaşantınızı ne kadar etkiliyor?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Hiç										Oldukça Fazla

9. Kendinizi politik olarak nerede konumlandırırsınız?

5	4	3	2	1	0	1	2	3	4	5
Sol					Merkez					Sağ

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadeyi dikkatlice okuyup yanıtlayınız.

“Bu çalışmanın içeriği ve ölçüm araçları hakkında daha önceden bilgi almadığımı onaylıyorum.”

Evet

Hayır

APPENDIX L. Debriefing Form

Katılım Sonrası Bilgi Formu

Çalışmaya katıldığınız için teşekkür ederiz. Çalışmada verdiğiniz yanıtlar tamamen gizli tutularak anonim şekilde saklanacak ve yalnızca bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılacaktır. Çalışmanın amacı Türkiye’de yaşayan ve kendini Türk olarak tanımlayan vatandaşların Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik dayanışma niyetlerini ölçmek olduğundan, kendini Türk olarak tanımlamayan katılımcılar çalışmaya dahil edilmemişlerdir. Bu çalışmadan beklenen sonuç, kolektif narsisizm ve iç grup imajı tehdidi kavramlarının Suriyeli mültecilere yönelik dayanışma niyetlerinin düzeyini etkilemesidir.

Çalışmada iç-grup imajı tehdidi manipüle edilmiştir. Katılımcılara iki ayrı mesaj içeriği okutulmuştur. Katılımcıların bir kısmı Suriyeli mültecilerin Türk bayrağını çöpten çıkarıp, demir korkuluklara asması konulu bir haber içeriğiyle karşılaşırken, katılımcıların diğer kısmı ise Suriyeli mültecilerin asılı olan Türk bayrağını indirip, çöpe atması konulu bir haber içeriğiyle karşılaşmıştır.

Araştırmanın esinlendiği mesaj içeriğinin aslı, kâğıt toplayıcılığı yapan Suriyeli çocukların Türk bayrağını çöpten çıkarıp, demir korkuluklara asması haberidir. **Suriyeli çocukların asılı olan Türk bayrağını indirip çöpe atması konulu haber ise kurmacadır.** Kurmaca mesaj içeriği araştırmanın amaçları doğrultusunda iç grup imajını tehdit etmek amacıyla manipüle edilmiştir. Bu mesaj içeriğinde, haberin orijinalinde bulunan fotoğraflar manipülasyon amaçlı ters sırada verilmiştir.

Çalışmaya katıldığınız için tekrar teşekkür ederiz. Soru, görüş ve önerileriniz için ve/veya çalışma ve çalışmanın sonuçları hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için Egesu Yıldırımkanlı’ya başvurabilirsiniz.

**APPENDIX M. Approval Form of the Human Research Evaluation Board of
TOBB University of Economics and Technology**



T.C.
TOBB EKONOMİ VE TEKNOLOJİ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
İnsan Araştırmaları Değerlendirme Kurulu

Sayı : E-27393295-100-28695
Konu : 2022-50 numaralı başvuru

26.08.2022

Sayın Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Gülriz ŞEN

İnsan Araştırmaları Değerlendirme Kurulu'na etik yönden değerlendirilmek üzere sunmuş olduğunuz 2022-50 kayıt numaralı "Kolektif Narsisizmin Dayanışma Temelli Kolektif Eyleme Katılım Niyetleri Üzerindeki Etkisi: İç-Grup İmajı Tehdidinin Moderatör Rolü" başlığını taşıyan projeniz etik yönden uygun görülerek onaylanmasına karar verilmiştir.
Bilgilerinizi rica ederiz

Prof. Dr. Tayyibe Nur ÇAĞLAR
Kurul Başkanı

Bu belge, güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

Belge Doğrulama Kodu :BSLEVCCTS
Sığıntı Caddesi No:43 06560 Sığıntı/Ankara
Telefon No:(0312) 292-4000 Faks No:(0312) 287-1946
e-Posta: bilgi@etu.edu.tr İnternet Adresi: www.etu.edu.tr
Kep Adresi: tobbetu@hs01.kep.tr

Belge Doğrulama Adresi : <https://www.turkiye.gov.tr/tobb-universitesi-ebys>

Bilgi için: Nimet Zorlu
Sekreter